e'-tam `eTam; Codex Alexandrinus, Apan, Codex Vaticanus, Aitan):
(1) Mentioned in Septuagint along with Tekoa, Bethlehem and Phagor (Josh 15:59). In 2 Ch 11:6 it occurs, between Bethlehem and Tekoa, as one of the cities built "for defense in Judah" by Rehoboam. Josephus writes that "there was a certain place, about 50 furlongs distant from Jerusalem which is called Ethan, very pleasant it is in fine gardens and abounding in rivulets of water; whither he (Solomon) used to go out in the morning" (Ant., VIII, vii, 3). Mention of `Ain `Aitan, which is described as the most elevated place in Palestine, occurs in the Talmud (Zebhachim 54b), and in the Jer. Talmud (Yoma' 3 fol 41) it is mentioned that a conduit ran from `Atan to the Temple.
The evidence all points to `Ain `Atan, the lowest of the springs supplying the aqueduct running to Solomon's pools. The gardens of Solomon may very well--by tradition, at any rate--have been in the fertile valley below `Urtas. The site of the ancient town Etam is rather to be looked for on an isolated hill, with ancient remains, a little to the East of `Ain `Atan. 1 Ch 4:3 may also have reference to this Etam.
(2) A town assigned to Simeon (1 Ch 4:32). Mentioned with EN-RIMMON (which see), identified by Conder with Khurbet `AiTun in the hills Northwest of Beersheba.
(3) The rock of Etam, where Samson took up his dwelling after smiting the Philistines "hip and thigh with a great slaughter" (Jdg 15:8,11), was in Judah but apparently in the low hill country (same place) . The rocky hill on which lies the village of Beit `Atab, near Sur`ah (Zorah), was suggested by Conder, but unless (3) is really identical width (1), which is quite possible, the cavern known as `Arak Isma`in, described by Hanauer (PEFS, 1886, 25), suits the requirements of the story better. The cavern, high up on the northern cliffs of the Wady Isma`in, is a noticeable object from the railway as the train enters the gorge.
E. W. G. Masterman
e-tur'-nal (`olam; aionios, from aion): The word "eternal" is of very varying import, both in the Scriptures and out of them.
In the Old Testament, the Hebrew word `olam is used for "eternity," sometimes in the sense of unlimited duration, sometimes in the sense of a cycle or an age, and sometimes, in later Hebrew, in the signification of world. The Hebrew `olam has, for its proper New Testament equivalent, aion, as signifying either time of particular duration, or the unending duration of time in general. Only, the Hebrew term primarily signified unlimited time, and only in a secondary sense represented a definite or specific period. Both the Hebrew and the Greek terms signify the world itself, as it moves in time.
In the New Testament, aion and aionios are often used with the meaning "eternal," in the predominant sense of futurity. The word aion primarily signifies time, in the sense of age or generation; it also comes to denote all that exists under time-conditions; and, finally, superimposed upon the temporal is an ethical use, relative to the world's course. Thus aion may be said to mean the subtle informing spirit of the world or cosmos--the totality of things. By Plato, in his Timaeus, aion was used of the eternal Being, whose counterpart, in the sense-world, is Time. To Aristotle, in speaking of the world, aion is the ultimate principle which, in itself, sums up all existence.. In the New Testament, aion is found combined with prepositions in nearly three score and ten instances, where the idea of unlimited duration appears to be meant. This is the usual method of expressing eternity in the Septuagint also. The aionios of 2 Cor 4:18 must be eternal, in a temporal use or reference, else the antithesis would be gone.
In Rom 1:20 the word aidios is used of Divine action and rendered in the King James Version "eternal" (the Revised Version (British and American) "everlasting"), the only other place in the New Testament where the word occurs being Jude 1:6, where the rendering is "everlasting," which accords with classical usage. But the presence of the idea of eternal in these passages does not impair the fact that aion and aionios are, in their natural and obvious connotation, the usual New Testament words for expressing the idea of eternal, and this holds strikingly true of the Septuagint usage also. For, from the idea of aeonian life, there is no reason to suppose the notion of duration excluded. The word aionios is sometimes used in the futurist signification, but often also, in the New Testament, it is concerned rather with the quality, than with the quantity or duration, of life. By the continual attachment of aionios to life, in this conception of the spiritual or Divine life in man, the aeonian conception was saved from becoming sterile.
In the use of aion and aionios there is evidenced a certain enlarging or advancing import till they come so to express the high and complex fact of the Divine life in man. In Greek, aiones signifies ages, or periods or dispensations. The aiones of Heb 1:2, and 11:3, is, however, to be taken as used in the concrete sense of "the worlds," and not "the ages," the world so taken meaning the totality of things in their course or flow.
Our Lord decisively set the element of time in abeyance, and took His stand upon the fact and quality of life--life endless by its own nature. Of that eternal life He is Himself the guarantee--"Because I live, ye shall live also" (Jn 14:19). Therefore said Augustine, "Join thyself to the eternal God, and thou wilt be eternal."
See ETERNITY .
James Lindsay
e-tur'-ni-ti (olam; Greek equivalent, aion):
1. Contrast with Time
2. In the Old Testament
3. In the New Testament
4. The Eternal "Now"
5. Defect of This View
6. Philosophical Views
7. Time Conceptions Inadequate
8. All Succession Present in One Act to Divine Consciousness
9. Yet Connection between Eternity and Time
10. The Religious Attitude to Eternity
LITERATURE
Eternity is best conceived, not in the merely negative form of the non-temporal, or immeasurable time, but positively, as the mode of the timeless self-existence of the Absolute Ground of the universe. The flux of time grows first intelligible to us, only when we take in the thought of God as eternal--exalted above time. Timeless existence--being or entity without change--is what we here mean by eternity, and not mere everlastingness or permanence through time. God, in His internal being, is raised above time; in His eternal absoluteness, He is throned above temporal development, and knows, as the Scriptures say, no changeableness. The conception of eternity, as without beginning or ending, leaves us with but a negation badly in need of filling out with reality. Eternity is not a mere negative idea; to make of eternity merely a blank and irrelevant negation of temporality would not satisfy any proper theory of being; it functions as the positive relation to time of that eternal God, who is King of all the eons.
In the Old Testament, God's eternity is only negatively expressed, as implying merely indefinitely extended time (Gen 21:33; Dt 33:27), though Isa 40:28 takes more absolute form. Better is the view of eternity, objectively considered, as a mode of being of God in relation to Himself. For He was eternal, while as yet the world and time were not. But even in the New Testament, the negative form of expression prevails.
Time, with its succession of events, helps to fill out such idea as we can form of the eternal, conceived as an endless progress. But, as finite beings, we can form no positive idea of eternity. Time is less contradictory of eternity, than helpful in revealing what we know of it. Plato, in his Timaeus, says that time is the "moving image of eternity," and we may allow that it is its type or revelation. Not as the annulment of time, though it might be held to be in itself exclusive of time, is eternity to be taken, but rather as the ground of its reality.
Eternity might, no doubt, be taken as just time no longer measured by the succession of events, as in the finite universe. But, on a strict view, there is something absurd in an eternity that includes time, and an eternity apart from time is a vain and impossible conception. Eternity, as a discharge from all time limits, is purely negative, though not without importance. Eternity, absolutely taken, must be pronounced incommensurable with time; as Aquinas said, non sunt mensurae unius generis. Eternity, that is to say, would lose its character as eternal in the very entering into relations with the changeful or becoming. Eternity, as in God, has, since the time of Augustine and the Middle Ages, been frequently conceived as an eternal Now. The Schoolmen were wont to adopt as a maxim that "in eternity is one only instant always present and persistent." This is but a way of describing eternity in a manner characteristic of succession in time; but eternal Deity, rather than an eternal Now, is a conception far more full of meaning for us.
To speak of God's eternity as an eternal Now--a present in the time-sense--involves a contradiction. For the eternal existence is no more described by the notion of a present than by a past or a future. Such a Now or present presupposes a not-now, and raises afresh the old time-troubles, in relation to eternity. Time is certainly not the form of God's life, His eternity meaning freedom from time. Hence, it was extremely troublesome to theology of the Middle Ages to have a God who was not in time at all, supposed to create the world at a particular moment in time.
Spinoza, in later times, made the eternity of God consist in His infinite--which, to Spinoza, meant His necessary--existence. For contingent or durational existence would not, in Spinoza's view, be eternal, though it lasted always. The illusoriness or unreality of time, in respect of man's spiritual life, is not always very firmly grasped. This wavering or uncertain hold of the illusiveness of time, or of higher reality as timeless, is still very prevalent; even so strong-souled a poet as Browning projects the shadow of time into eternity, with rarely a definite conception of the higher life as an eternal and timeless essence; and although Kant, Hegel and Schopenhauer may have held to such a timeless view, it has by no means become a generally adopted doctrine so far, either of theologians or of philosophers. If time be so taken as unreal, then eternity must not be thought of as future, as is done by Dr. Ellis McTaggart and some other metaphysicians today. For nothing could, in that case, be properly future, and eternity could not be said to begin, as is often done in everyday life.
The importance of the eternity conception is seen in the fact that neo-Kantian and neo-Hegelian thinkers alike have shown a general tendency to regard time-conceptions as unfit, in metaphysics, for the ultimate explanation of the universe.
7. Time-Conceptions Inadequate:
Eternity, one may surely hold, must span or include, for God's eternal consciousness, the whole of what happens in time, with all of past, present or future, that lies within the temporal succession. But we are by no means entitled to say, as does Royce, that such wholeness or totality of the temporal constitutes the eternal, for the eternal belongs to quite another order, that, namely, of timeless reality. Eternity is not to be defined in terms of time at all. For God is to us the supra-temporal ens perfectissimum, but One whose timeless self-sufficiency and impassable aloofness are not such as to keep Him from being strength and helper of our temporal striving. Our metaphysical convictions must not here be of barren and unfruitful sort for ethical results and purposes.
8. All Succession Present in One Act to Divine Consciousness:
Eternity is, in our view, the form of an eternal existence, to which, in the unity of a single insight, the infinite series of varying aspects or processes are, together-wise, as a totum simul, present. But this, as we have already shown, does not imply that the eternal order is nowise different, essentially, from the temporal; time is not to be treated as a segment of eternity, nor eternity regarded as interminable duration; the eternal cannot pass over into the temporal; for, an eternal Being, who should think all things as present, and yet view the time-series as a succession, must be a rather self-contradictory conception. For the Absolute Consciousness, time does not exist; the future cannot, for it, be thought of as beginning to be, nor the past as having ceased to be.
9. Yet Connection Between Eternity and Time:
After all that has been said, however, eternity and time are not to be thought of as without connection. For the temporal presupposes the eternal, which is, in fact, its positive ground and its perpetual possibility. These things are so, if only for the reason that the Divine mode of existence does not contradict or exclude the human mode of existence. The continuity of the latter--of the temporal--has its guaranty in the eternal. The unconditioned eternity of God brings into harmony with itself the limitations and conditions of the temporal. For time is purely relative, which eternity is not. No distinctions of before and after are admissible in the eternity conception, hence, we have no right to speak of time as a portion of eternity. Thus, while we maintain the essential difference between eternity and time, we at the same time affirm what may perhaps be called the affinity between them. The metaphysics of eternity and its time-relations continue to be matter of proverbial difficulty, and both orders--the eternal and the temporal--had better be treated as concrete, and not left merely to abstract reflection. Our idea of the eternal will best be developed, in this concrete fashion, by the growth of our God-idea, as we more completely apprehend God, as actualized for us in His incarnate Son.
10. The Religious Attitude to Eternity:
Thus, then, it is eternity, not as immeasurable time, but rather as a mode of being of the immutable God, who is yet progressively revealing Himself in time, which we have here set forth. This is not to say that the religious consciousness has not its own need of the conception of God as being "from everlasting to everlasting," as in Ps 90:2, and of His kingdom as "an everlasting kingdom" (Dan 4:3). Nor is it to make us suppose that the absolute and self-existent God, who so transcends all time-dependence, is thereby removed far from us, while, on the contrary, His very greatness makes Him the more able to draw near unto us, in all the plenitude of His being. Hence, it is so truly spoken in Isa 57:15, "Thus saith the high and lofty One that inhabiteth eternity, whose name is Holy: I dwell in the high and holy place, with him also that is of a contrite and humble spirit, to revive the spirit of the humble, and to revive the heart of the contrite." Hence, also the profound truthfulness of sayings like that in Acts 17:27,28, "He is not far from each one of us: for in him we live, and move, and have our being." After all that has been said, our best knowledge of eternity, as it exists in God, is not developed in any metaphysical fashion, but after the positive and timeless modes of the spiritual life--the modes of trust and love.
LITERATURE.
H. Cremer, Lexicon of New Testament Greek, English edition, 1880; G. B. Winer, Grammar of New Testament Greek, 3rd edition, 1882; R. C. French, Synonyms of the New Testament, 9th edition, 1880; E. H. Plumptre, The Spirits in Prison, 3rd edition, 1885; J. Orr, Christian View of God and the World, lst edition, 1893; I. A. Dorner, System of Christian Doctrine, English edition, 1885; J. H. Stirling, Philosophy and Theology, 1890; J. Lindsay, Studies in European Philosophy, 1909; The Fundamental Problems of Metaphysics, 1910.
James Lindsay
eth-ka'-zin (`ittah qatsin; the King James Version Ittah Kazin): A town on the eastern border of Zebulun, mentioned between Gath-hepher and Rimmon (Josh 19:13). The site is not identified. "Ittah" of the King James Version is due to misunderstanding of the Hebrew letter "he" locale.
e'-tham ('etham; Othom, Ex 13:20; Bouthan, Nu 33:6,7; in 33:8 the Septuagint has a different reading, "in their wilderness" showing another pointing for the word): The name used to be explained as the Coptic Atium, "border of the Sea" (Gesenius, Lexicon, under the word) which would agree with the Hebrew (Nu 33:8) where the "wilderness of Etham" is noticed instead of that of Shur (Ex 15:22) East of the Red Sea (see SHUR ). At Etham (Ex 13:20), the Hebrews camped in the "edge," or at "the end," of the desert West of the sea that they were to cross (see EXODUS ). This camp was probably near the North end of the Bitter Lakes, a march from Succoth. Brugsch (Hist. Egypt, II, 359) would compare Etham with the Egyptian Khetam ("fort"), but the Hebrew word has no guttural. The word Khetam is not the name of a place (see Pierret, Vocab. hieroglyph., 453), and more than one such "fort" seems to be noticed (see PITHOM ). In the reign of Seti II a scribe's report mentions the pursuit of two servants, apparently from Zoan, to the fortress of I-k-u southward, reaching Khetam on the 3rd day; but if this was the "Khetam of Rameses II," or even that "of Minepthah," it would not apparently suit the position of Etham.
See MIGDOL .
C. R. Conder.
e'-than ('ethan, "firm," "enduring"; Gaithan):
(1) A wise man with whom Solomon is compared (1 Ki 4:31). Called there "Ethan the Ezrahite," to whom the title of Ps 89 ascribes the authorship of that poem.
(2) A "son of Kishi," or "Kishaiah," of the Merari branch of the Levites, and, along with Heman and Asaph, placed by David over the service of song (1 Ch 6:44; 15:17,19).
See JEDUTHUN .
(3) An ancestor of Asaph of the Gershomite branch of the Levites (1 Ch 6:42).
eth'-a-nim ('ethanim): The seventh month of the Jewish year (1 Ki 8:2). The word is of Phoenician origin and signifies "perennial," referring to living streams. It corresponds to September-October.
e-tha'-nus, the King James Version Ecanus (Apocrypha): One of the scribes who wrote for forty days at the dictation of Ezra (2 Esdras 14:24).
eth-ba'-al, eth'-ba-al ('ethba`al, "with Baal"): "King of the Sidonians," and father of Jezebel whom Ahab king of Israel took to wife (1 Ki 16:31).
e'-ther (`ether; Ather): A town in Judah (Josh 15:42), near Libnah, assigned to Simeon (Josh 19:7). Kh. el `Atr (identical in spelling with Ether) is possibly the site. It is near Beit Jibrin and is described as "an ancient site: cisterns, foundations, quarried rock and terraces" (PEF, III, 261, 279).
eth'-iks:
1. The Blessings of the Kingdom
(2) Blessedness of the Kingdom
(3) Righteousness--Its Contrasts
2. The Character of the Subjects of the Kingdom
(3) Attainment of Righteousness
"Coming" to Christ
(c) Imitation of Christ--Service Example of Jesus
The Great Commandments
God's Worship, etc.
The Church
Exemplified in Christ
The New Motives
6. Fruits of Union with Christ
LITERATURE
If, following the custom prevalent at present, we adopt, as the general name for the teaching of Jesus in the Synoptists, the Kingdom of God, then the divisions of His ethical teaching will be (1) the Blessings of the Kingdom, (2) the Character of the Subjects, (3) the Commandments of the King.
1. The Blessings of the Kingdom:
"The Kingdom of God" was not a phrase invented by Jesus. It was used before Him by the Baptist. Its proximate source, for both Jesus and John, was the prophet Daniel, who uses it in very striking passages (2:44,45; 7:13,14). The idea of a kingdom of God goes back to the very commencement of the monarchy in Israel, when the prophet Samuel told those who demanded a king that Yahweh was their king, and that they should desire no other. Through all the subsequent history of the monarchy, which was, on the whole, so disappointing to patriotic and pious minds, the conviction lingered that, if God Himself were king, all would be well; and, when at length the Hebrew state was destroyed and the people were carried into captivity, the prophets still believed that for their country there was a future and a hope, if only Yahweh would take to Himself His great power and reign. In the period between the Old Testament and the New Testament such sentiments so greatly prevailed that Schurer has compiled, from the apocryphal literature, a kind of Messianic creed, embracing no fewer than eleven articles, which he supposes to have prevailed before the Advent. It may be doubtful how far such beliefs had taken possession of the general mind. Many of the Sadducees were too satisfied with things as they were to concern themselves about such dreams. But the Pharisees undoubtedly gave a large place in their minds to Messianic expectations, and for these the Zealots were ready to fight. It is, however, to the prosdechomenoi, as they are called, because they were "waiting for the consolation of Israel," that we must look for the purest expression of this heritage derived from the piety of the past. In the hymns at the beginning of the Gospels of Matthew and Luke, with which the birth of Jesus was greeted, we encounter an intense and lofty conception of the kingdom of God; and, as the earthly home in which Jesus grew up belonged to this select section of the population, there is little doubt that it was here He imbibed both His Messianic ideas and the phraseology in which these were expressed. His use of the term, the kingdom of God, has sometimes been spoken of as an accommodation to the beliefs and language of His fellow-countrymen. But it was native to Himself; and it is not unlikely that the very commonness of it in the circle in which He grew up rendered Him unconscious of the difference between His own conception and that which prevailed outside of this circle. For, as soon as He began to preach and to make known the sentiments which He included within this phrase, it became manifest that He and His contemporaries, under a common name, were thinking of entirely different things. They emphasized the first half of the phrase--"the kingdom"; He the second--"of God." They were thinking of the external attributes of a kingdom--political emancipation, an army, a court, subject provinces; He of the doing of God's will on earth as it is done in heaven. Even He had felt, at one stage, the glamor of their point of view, as is manifest from the account of the Temptation in the Wilderness; but He had decisively rejected it, resolving not to commence with an external framework on a large scale, to be subsequently filled with character, but to begin with the individual, and trust to time and Providence for visible success. The triumphal entry into Jerusalem proves that He never abandoned the claim to be the fulfiller of all the Old Testament predictions about the kingdom of God; but His enemies not unnaturally interpreted the failure of that attempt as a final demonstration that their own view had been the correct one all along. Still, God was not mocked, and Jesus was not mocked. When, at the end of a generation, the Jewish state sank into ruin and the city by which Jesus was martyred had been destroyed, there were springing up, all over the world, communities the members of which were bound more closely to one another than the members of any other kingdom, obeyed the same laws and enjoyed the same benefits, which they traced up to a King ruling in the heavens, who would appear again on the great white throne, to be the Judge of quick and dead.
(2) Blessedness of the Kingdom.
The enemies of Jesus may be said to have carried out to the bitter end their conception of the kingdom of God, when they nailed Him to a tree; but, in the face of opposition, He carried out His own conception of it too, and He never abandoned the practice of employing this phrase as a comprehensive term for all the blessings brought by Him to mankind. He used, however, other nomenclature for the same objects, such as Gospel, Peace, Rest, Life, Eternal Life, Blessedness. His exposition of the last of these, at the commencement of the Sermon on the Mount, is highly instructive. Seldom, indeed, has the structure of the Beatitudes been clearly understood. Each of them is an equation, in which "blessed" stands on the one side and on the other two magnitudes--the one contained in the subject of the sentence, such as "the poor in spirit," "the meek," and so on; and the other contained in a qualifying clause introduced by "for." Sometimes one of these magnitudes may be a minus quantity,
as in "they that mourn"; but the other is so large a positive magnitude that the two together represent a handsome plus, which thoroughly justifies the predicate "blessed." It is remarkable that the first and the eighth of the reasons introduced by "for" are the same: "for theirs is the kingdom of heaven," justifying the statement that this is Christ's own name for the blessedness brought by Him to the world; and the sentences between these, introduced in the same way, may be looked upon as epexegetic of this great phrase. They embrace such great conceptions as comfort, mercy, the inheritance of the earth, the vision of God and sonship, which are all certainly blessings of the kingdom; and the list does not finish without mentioning a great reward in heaven--an immortal hope, which is the greatest blessing of all.
(3) Righteousness--Its Contrasts.
If the preacher of the Sermon on the Mount was to expound at length any one of these bright conceptions, it might have been expected to be the kingdom of God itself; and this we should have desired. But the one to which this honor fell has still to be mentioned. It is "righteousness." In one of the Beatitudes the speaker had promised that to be filled with this should be part of the blessedness which He was expounding; and, when He had finished the Beatitudes, He turned back to this conception and devoted the rest of His discourse to its interpretation. Nowhere else, in the reports of His preaching which have come down to us, is there to be found an exposition so sustained and thorough. There is no better way of describing a new thing, with which those who listen are unfamiliar, than to contrast it with something with which they are perfectly acquainted; and this was the method adopted by Jesus. He contrasted the righteousness with which the subjects of the kingdom were to be blessed with the figure of the righteous man familiar to them, first, in the discourses of the scribes, to which they were wont to listen in the synagogue, and secondly, in the example of the Pharisees, to whom they were wont to look up as the patterns of righteousness. It is well known what ample opportunities He found, by means of this felicitous disposition, for probing to the very depths of morality, as well as for covering His opponents with ridicule and exploding the honor in which they stood with the masses. The whole of this scheme is, however, exhausted long before the Sermon comes to a close; and the question is, whether, in the latter half of the Sermon, He still keeps up the exposition of righteousness by contrasting it with the ordinary course of the world. I am inclined to think that this is the case, and that the key to the latter half of the discourse is the contrast between righteousness and worldliness. The doctrine, at all events, which issues from the whole discussion is that the righteousness promised is distinguished by three characteristics--inwardness, as distinguished from the externality of those who believed morality to extend to outward words and deeds alone, and not to the secret thoughts of the heart; secrecy, as distinguished from the ostentation of those who blew a trumpet before them when they were doing their alms; and naturalness, like that of the flower or the fruit, which grows spontaneously from a healthy root, without forcing.
See SERMON ON THE MOUNT .
This substitution of righteousness for the kingdom in the greatest public discourse which has come down to us is a significant indication of the direction in which the mind of Jesus was tending, as He drew away from the notions and hopes of contemporary Judaism. It is evident that He was filling the idea of the kingdom more and more with religious and moral contents, and emptying it of political and material elements. There are scholars, indeed, at the present day, who maintain that His conception of the kingdom was futuristic, and that He was waiting all the time for an apocalyptic manifestation, which never came. He was, they think, expecting the heavens to open and the kingdom to descend ready made to the earth, like the New Jerusalem in the Apocalypse. But this is to assume toward Jesus exactly the attitude taken up toward Him in His own day by Pharisees and high priests, and it degrades Him to the level of an apocalyptic dreamer. It ignores many sayings of His, of which the parable of the Mustard Seed may be taken as an example, which prove that He anticipated for Christianity a long development such as it has actually passed through; and it fails to do justice to many passages in His teaching where He speaks of the kingdom as already come. Of the latter the most remarkable is where He says, "The kingdom of God is within you"--a statement preceded by a distinct rejection of the notion of an apocalyptic manifestation; for the word "observation," which He employs in describing the way in which the kingdom is not to come, is an astronomical term, describing precisely such a phenomenon as He is supposed by such scholars as John Weiss and Schweitzer to have been expecting. The more it became evident that He was not to command the homage of the nation, the more did He devote Himself to the education of the Twelve, that they might form the nucleus of His kingdom upon earth; and it was certainly not with apocalyptic visions that He fed their receptive minds.
2. The Character of the Subjects of the Kingdom:
The righteousness described so comprehensively in the Sermon on the Mount is not infrequently spoken of as the condition of entrance to the kingdom of God; but this is altogether to misunderstand the mind of Jesus. The righteousness described by Him is the gift of God to those who are already inside the kingdom; for it is the supreme blessing for the sake of which the kingdom is to be sought; and the condition imposed on those who are outside is not the possession of righteousness, but rather a bottomless sense of the want of it. The more utterly they feel their own lack of righteousness, the more ready are they for entrance into the kingdom. They must "hunger and thirst after righteousness." It has been remarked already that the description, in the Beatitudes, of the character of the candidates for the kingdom is sometimes of a negative character; and indeed, this is the account in the teaching of Jesus generally of those whom He attracts to Himself. They are drawn by a sense of boundless need in themselves and by the apprehension of an equivalent fullness in Him; He calls those "that labor and are heavy laden," that He may give them rest.
The first word of the prophetic message in the Old Testament was always the denunciation of sin; and only after this had done its work did the vision of a good time coming rise on the horizon. The same was repeated in the message of John the Baptist; and it did not fail to reappear in the teaching of Jesus, though His mode of treating the subject was entirely His own. He did not, like the prophets, take up much time with convicting gross and open sinners. Perhaps He thought that this had been sufficiently done by His predecessors; or, perhaps He refrained because He understood the art of getting sinners to convict themselves. Yet, in the parable of the Prodigal Son, He showed how profoundly He understood the nature and the course of the commonest sins. If, however, He thus spared transgressors who had no covering for their wickedness, He made up for this leniency by the vigor and even violence with which He attacked those who hid their sins under a cloak of hypocrisy. Never was there a prophetic indignation like that with which He assailed such sinners in Mt 23; and He shaped the same charges into an unforgettable picture in the parable of the Pharisee and the Publican. He never named the Sadducees in the same unreserved manner as He thus designated their antagonists; but in more parables than one it is possible that He had them in view. The Unjust Judge was probably a Sadducee; and so was the Rich Man at whose gate the beggar Lazarus was wont to sit. The sin of the Sadducees, at all events, did not escape His prophetic animadversion. In Lk especially He alludes with great frequency to worldliness and the love of money as cankers by which the life of the human soul is eaten out and its destiny destroyed. Thus did Jesus exercise the prophetic office of denouncing all the sins of His time; and He showed what, in this respect, He thought of mankind in general when He began a sentence with, "If ye then, being evil" (Lk 11:13), and when He gave the dreadful description of the heart of man which begins, "Out of the heart come forth evil thoughts" (Mt 15:19).
(3) Attainment of Righteousness.
To all serious students of the Sermon on the Mount it is well known that the popular notion of it, as containing a simple religion and an easy-going morality, is utterly mistaken; on the contrary, the righteousness sketched by the Preacher is far loftier than that ever conceived by any other religious teacher whatever. Not only, however, does He thus propose to conduct human beings to a platform of attainment higher than any attempted before, but He, at the same time, recognizes that He must begin with men lower than almost any others have allowed. It is here that the ethics of Jesus differ from those of the philosophers. He takes the task much more seriously; and, as the ascent from the one extreme to the other is much longer, so the means of reaching the goal are much more difficult. Philosophers, assuming that man is equal to his own destiny, lay the demands of the moral law before him at once, taking it for granted that he is able to fulfill them; but the path adopted by Jesus is more remote and humbling. There are in it steps or stages which, in His teaching, it is easy to discern.
The first of these is repentance. This was a watchword of all the prophets: after sin had been denounced, penitence was called for; and no hope of improvement was held out until this had been experienced. In the message of John the Baptist it held the same place; and, in one of the Gospels, it is expressly stated that Jesus began His ministry by repeating this watchword of His predecessor. Not a few of the most touching scenes of His earthly ministry exhibit penitents at His feet, the most moving of them all being that of the woman who was "a sinner"; and, in the parable of the Prodigal Son, we have a full-length picture of the process of repentance.
The second step is faith--a word of constant recurrence in the teaching Of Jesus. In many cases it is connected with His healing ministry; but this was a parable of a more interior ministry for the soul. In many cases it formed a school of preparation for the other, as in the case of the man borne of four, who was brought to Christ for the healing of his body, but was presented, in addition, with the gift of the forgiveness of his sins. In healing him Jesus expressly claimed the power of forgiving sins; and, in His great saying at the institution of the Lord's Supper, He showed the connection which this was to have with His own death.
(c) Imitation of Christ--Service:
Instead of speaking of faith and of believing, Jesus frequently spoke of "coming" to Himself; and then followed the invitation to "follow" Him, which, accordingly, is the third stage. Following Him meant, in many cases, literally leaving home and occupation, in order to accompany Him from place to place, as He journeyed through the land; and, as this involved sacrifice and self-denial, He frequently combined with "following" the invitation to take up "the cross." But by degrees this literal meaning dropped away from the invitation, or at least became secondary to that of imitation, which must be the only meaning when Paul, adopting the language of his Master, calls upon men and women to be "followers" of him, as he was of Christ. It is seldom that Jesus, in so many words, calls upon others to imitate Himself; indeed, He does so less frequently than Paul; but it is implied in following Him, if not literally expressed; and it was a direct consequence of keeping company with Him and coming under the influence of His example. It is highly characteristic that, in the only place where He directly calls upon others to "learn" from Him, the virtue to which He draws attention is meekness--"Learn of me; for I am meek and lowly in heart." The same quality was often emphasized by Him, when He was describing the character which He wished to see exhibited by others, "For every one that exalteth himself shall be humbled; and he that humbleth himself shall be exalted" (Lk 14:11). In spite, however, of the importance thus attached by Him to humility, He not only combined with it, as has been pointed out by Bushnell, in his famous chapter on the character of Christ in Nature and the Supernatural, the most stupendous personal claims, but also attributed to His followers a position of personal distinction among men, and called upon them to perform services far beyond the reach of ordinary mortals, saying to them, "Ye are the salt of the earth," "Ye are the light of the world," and ordering them to make disciples of all nations. The principle by which this apparent contradiction is bridged over is another favorite idea of His teaching, namely, Service. He who is able to serve others on a large scale is, in a sense, superior to those he serves, because he is furnished with the resources of which they stand in need; yet he places himself beneath them and forgets his own claims in ministering to their necessities. There are few of the utterances of Jesus in which the very genius of His ethical system is more fully expressed than that in which He contrasts greatness as it is conceived among men of the world with greatness as He conceives it and His followers must learn to conceive it: "Ye know that the princes of the Gentiles exercise dominion over them, and they that are great exercise authority upon them. But it shall not be so among you: but whosoever will be great among you, let him be your minister; and whosoever will be chief among you, let him be your servant." Of this difficult rule, He was able to add, He Himself had given, and was still to give, the most perfect illustration; for "even the Son of man came not to be ministered unto, but to minister, and to give his life a ransom for many" (Mt 20:25 ff the King James Version).
This reminds us that, while the character of the subjects of the kingdom is to be learned from the words of Jesus, it may be also derived from His example. That which He demanded from others He fulfilled in His own conduct; and thus the dry precepts of the moral law were invested with the charm of a living personality. Brief as the records of His life are, they are wonderfully rich in instruction of this kind; and it is possible, by going through them with study and care, to form a clear image of how He bore Himself in all the departments of human life--in the home, in the state, in the church, as a friend, in society, as a man of prayer, as a student of Scripture, as a worker, as a sufferer, as a philanthropist, as a winner of souls, as a preacher, as a teacher, as a controversialist, and so on. This is the modern imitation of Christ--that of the details of His earthly existence--the Imitation of a Kempis was an imitation of the cosmical history of the Son of God, as He moves on His Divine mission from heaven to the cross and back to the throne of the universe. See the writer's Imago Christi.
The Great Commandments.
In accordance with Scriptural usage, Jesus called by the name of "commandments" those actions which we call "duties"; and He has made this part of our subject easy by reducing the commandments to two: "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and with all thy soul, and with all thy mind. This is the great and first commandment. And a second like unto it is this, Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself" (Mt 22:37-39). He did not invent either of these commandments; for both occur in the Old Testament (Dt 6:5; Lev 19:18). There, however, they lie far apart and are buried out of sight. The second of them was still more deeply buried under a misinterpretation of the scribes, to which reference is made in the Sermon on the Mount. Jesus rescued them from oblivion; He showed the vital and indissoluble connection between the sentiments which they enforce--love of God and love of man--which had been long and violently separated; and He lifted them up into the firmament of ethics, to shine forever as the sun and moon of duty.
It has been denied by some writers on Christian ethics that there can be any such thing as duties to God, and by writers on philosophical ethics love to God is not generally regarded as coming within the scope of their science. But the duty of man is concerned with all the objects, and especially all the beings, he is related to; and to Jesus the outflow of man's heart toward Him who is the author of his being and the source of all his blessings seemed the most natural of actions. "I love Yahweh" was a sentiment to which mankind had risen even in the Old Testament (Ps 116:1), where it corresponds with not a few expressions of the Divine love equally fervent; and it is not a figure of speech at all when Jesus demands love for His Father from heart and soul, strength and mind.
Love to God involves, however, love to what may be called the Things of God, toward which Jesus always manifested tenderness and honor. Those who are not themselves ecclesiastically minded have, indeed, taken it for granted that Jesus was indifferent, if not hostile, to the objects and actions by which the Almighty is honored; and it is often said that the only service of God which mattered in His eyes was the service of man. But, although, like the prophets before Him, Jesus exposed with withering rebuke the hypocrisy of those who put ritual in the place of righteousness, it requires no more than a glance at His sayings, and the other records of His life, to perceive that His mind was occupied no less with duties to God than with duties to men; indeed, the former bulk more largely in His teaching. The only arrangement of religion with which He seems out of sympathy is the Sabbath; but this was due to a peculiarity of the times; and it is quite conceivable that in other circumstances He might have been a strenuous supporter of Sabbath observance. If there had been in His day a Sadducean attempt to rob the people of the day of rest, He would have opposed it as strenuously as He did the Pharisaic attempt to make it a burden and a weariness to the common man. By declaring the Sabbath to have been made for man (Mk 2:27) He recognized that it was instituted at the beginning and intended for the entire course of man's existence upon earth. With the other things of God, such as His House, His Word, and His Worship, He manifested sympathy equally by word and deed; He frequented both the Temple and the synagogue; so imbued was His mind with the lit of the Old Testament that He spoke habitually in its spirit and phraseology, having its figures and incidents perfectly at command; and by both precept and example He taught others to pray.
Nothing is commoner than the statement that Jesus had nothing to do with the founding of the church or the arrangement of its polity; but this is a subjective prejudice, blind to the facts of the case. Jesus realized that the worship of the Old Testament was passing away, but He was Himself to replace it by a better order. He did not merely breathe into the air a spirit of sweetness and light; if this had been all He did, Christianity would soon have vanished from the earth; but He provided channels in which, after His departure, His influence should flow to subsequent generations. Not only did He found the church, but He appointed the most important details of its organization, such as preaching and the sacraments; and He left the Twelve behind Him not only as teachers, but as those who were able to instruct other teachers also. There may be ecclesiastical arrangements which are worked in a spirit far removed from the love of God; and such are of course contrary to the mind of Christ; but the love of God, if it is strong, inevitably overflows into the things of God, and cannot, in fact, permanently exist without them.
As has been hinted above, the sayings of our Lord about the details of duty to man are less numerous than might have been expected, but what may be lacking in numbers is made up for in originality and comprehensiveness. Many single sayings, like the Golden Rule (Mt 7:12) and the lovely word about a cup of cold water given in the name of Christ (Mt 10:42), are revolutionary in the ethical experience of mankind; and so are such parables as the Good Samaritan, the Prodigal Son and the Unmerciful Servant. The commandment to love enemies and to forgive injuries (Mt 5:43-48), if not entirely novel, received a prominence it had never possessed before. The spirit of all such sayings of Jesus is the same: He seeks to redeem men from selfishness and worldliness and to produce in them a godlike passion for the welfare of their fellow-creatures. These they may bless with gifts of money, where such may be required, still more with sympathy and helpfulness, but most of all with the gospel.
Besides such directions as to the behavior of man to man, there are also among the words of Jesus memorable maxims about the conduct of life in the family, in the state, and in society; and here again He taught even more by example than by precept. As son, brother and friend, He fulfilled all righteousness; but He also, as teacher, determined what righteousness was. Thus He opposed the laxity as to divorce prevalent in His time, pointing back to the pure ideal of Paradise. His conception of womanhood and His tenderness toward childhood have altered entirely the conceptions of men about these two conditions. He was a patriot, glorying in the beauty of His native Galilee and weeping over Jerusalem; and though, from birth to death, He was exposed to constant persecution from the constituted authorities, He not only obeyed these Himself but commanded all others to do the same. Nothing moved Him more than the sight of talents unused, and, therefore, it lay deep in His system of thought to call upon everyone to contribute his part to the service of the body politic; but no less did He recognize the right of those who have done their part of the general task to share in the fruits of industry; "for the laborer is worthy of his hire" (Lk 10:7).
Priceless, however, as are the commandments of Jesus in regard to the things of man, as well as in regard to the things of God, it is not in these that we have to seek His ethical originality, but in the new motive brought into play by Him for doing the Divine will, when once it has been ascertained. As He made it easy to love God by revealing God's love, so did He make it easy to love man by revealing the greatness of man, as an immortal creature, who has come from God and is going to God. Whatever is done to man, good or evil, Jesus esteems as done to Himself; for the great saying to this effect, in the account of the Last Judgment in Mt 25, though applicable in the first place to Christians, may be extended to men in general. The corollary of the fatherhood of God is the brotherhood of men; and the second great commandment stands under the protection of the first.
In the Fourth Gospel Eternal Life takes the same place as the kingdom of God in the other three. The author is not, indeed, unaware that Jesus employed the latter phrase for the sum of the blessings brought by Him to the world; and it has already been remarked that the Synoptists occasionally employ "life" as an equivalent for the phrase they usually make use of. The reason of John's preference for his own phrase may have lain in some personal idiosyncrasy, or it may have been due to the Gentileenvironment in which he wrote. But the phrase is one suggestive and instructive in itself in the highest degree. It had already entered deeply into the language of religion before the time of Christ; indeed, in every part of Holy Writ the idea is common that separation from God is death, but that union with Him is life.
In the teaching of Jesus, as this is found in John, the world lies in death, because it has become separated from God, and the children of men are in danger of perishing everlastingly as the punishment of their sin; but "God so loved the world, that he gave his only begotten Son, that whosoever believeth on him should not perish, but have eternal life" (Jn 3:16).
This life is, first, in God, who abides in everlasting blessedness; but it is not, even in Him, at rest, but agitated with an impulse to communicate itself. Then, it is in the Son--"For as the Father hath life in himself, even so gave he to the Son also to have life in himself" (Jn 5:26); not, however, for Himself alone, but for the purpose of being communicated to those destitute of it. For this reason He was made flesh and dwelt among us; and He communicated it through His words, which were "words of eternal life." The words of Jesus, as thus bringing life, are the "light" of the world; and they are the "truth"--two favorite expressions of this Gospel--or He of whom they speak is Himself the light and the truth; He said Himself, "I am the way, and the truth, and the life." He is in His word in such a way that, when it is received in the right spirit, He enters the soul personally--"ye in me, and I in you" (Jn 14:20). As food is taken into the body, to sustain life, so does He become the life of the soul; He is the "bread of life" and the "water of life" (Jn 6:35). As, however, bread has to be broken, before it is eaten, and water to be poured out, when it is drunk, so does the virtue which is in the Son of God only become available through His death--"I am the living bread which came down out of heaven: if any man eat of this bread, he shall live for ever: yea and the bread which I will give is my flesh, for the life of the world" (Jn 6:51).
The world lying dead in sin, a new birth is required for those who are to enter into life; and this is necessary even for so fine a character as Nicodemus (Jn 3:3,5,7). Without this change, the children of men are insensible to Divine revelations; and even the children of privilege, who had enjoyed the Old Testament revelation, were indifferent to eternal life, when it came near to them in the person of Christ. Hence, there was required a special drawing on the part of God to awaken the sleeping soul--"No man can come to me, except the Father that sent me draw him" (Jn 6:44); and, where this influence was not responded to, there might be the most violent and persistent opposition to Christ on the part of those who believed themselves to be the favorites of heaven. The new birth is accompanied with spiritual vision--"seeing the kingdom of God" (Jn 3:3)--and, throughout the Fourth Gospel, remarkable stress is laid on the virtue of such seeing or knowing. It leads so directly to faith that to "know" and to "believe" are virtually the same act (Jn 10:38). Faith is the reception into the soul of the life eternal, or of Him who has been discerned by the spiritual vision and who is Himself the life. It is the eating of the bread of life, the drinking of the water of life, and it makes and keeps alive.
Since faith is thus the means whereby the eternal life becomes a personal possession, it is the one thing needful and the sum of all the commandments--"This is the work of God, that ye believe on him whom he hath sent" (Jn 6:29). It is the unique commandment, comprehending all the commandments, and it "worketh by love" toward the fulfillment of them all. What these are is, however, less brought out in detail in this Gospel than in the others, for it is a peculiarity of the mind of Jesus, as recorded by John, to deal with central principles and to assume that the consequences will follow as a matter of course. Of the organization, for example, of the community which was to perpetuate His influence, after He had left the world, He says much less in this Gospel than even in the Synoptists; yet He characterizes the very essence of the new body in such words as this, "I in them, and thou in me, that they may be perfected into one; that the world may know that thou didst send me, and lovedst them, even as thou lovedst me" (Jn 17:23). In the last half of this saying there is a hint of the influence to be exerted on the outside world by the display of Christian character, with the result of producing belief; but this aim was to be sought more directly through testimony (Jn 15:27) and the "word" of the disciples (Jn 17:20). Thus would even the distant, "which are not of this fold," be brought in, so that there might be "one flock" and "one shepherd" (Jn 10:16). Inside the fold it is the greatest privilege and honor, as well as responsibility, to feed the "sheep" and to feed the "lambs" (Jn 21:15,16,17).
6. Fruits of Union with Christ:
Character and conduct are, even for the disciples of Christ, "commandments," as, indeed, Jesus does not disdain to speak of the various parts of His own vocation by the same humble name, implying the necessity of moral effort and the temptation to failure (Jn 15:10). Therefore, they are also proper subjects for prayer. He prayed for the disciples, both that they might be kept from the evil in the world and that they might be sanctified through the truth (Jn 17:15,17), and doubtless He expected them to ask the same things for themselves, as theirs was to be a life of prayer (Jn 16:24). But, in the last resort, they are the fruits of union with Himself, and eternal life is not merely a gift of the future, to be given at the death of the body, but is enjoyed even now by those who abide in the vine.
LITERATURE.
Monographs on the ethics of Jesus in German by Grimm and in English by King; compare also Peabody, Jesus Christ and the Social Question, and Jesus Christ and the Christian Character; relevant portions works of larger scope, such as Jacoby, New Testament Ethik, Wendt, The Teaching of Jesus, and the handbooks of New Testament theology by Weiss, Holtzmann, Schlatter, Feine, Weinel, Stevens. Very ample references to literature in Stalker, The Ethic of Jesus.
James Stalker
eth'-iks:
I. NATURE AND FUNCTION OF ETHICS
4. Relation to Cognate Sciences
The "Ought"
5. Relation of Christian Ethics to Moral Philosophy
6. Relation of Christian Ethics to Dogmatics
(b) The Christian Doctrine of Sin
II. HISTORICAL SKETCH OF ETHICS
Descartes and Spinoza
(2) Watchwords: Pleasure and Duty
III. PRINCIPLES AND CHARACTERISTICS OF BIBLICAL ETHICS
1. Ethics of the Old Testament
(1) Religious Characteristics of Hebrew Ethics
(2) Limitations of Old Testament Ethics
2. Outline of New Testament Ethics
(3) Brotherhood and Unity of Man
4. The Dynamic Power of the New Life
(1) The Dynamic on Its Divine Side
(2) The Dynamic on Its Human Side
5. Virtues, Duties and Spheres of the New Life
(b) Duties in Relation to Others
Absoluteness, Inwardness and Universality
LITERATURE
In this article, which proposes to be of a general and introductory character, we shall first deal with the nature and function of ethics generally, showing its difference from and relation to other cognate branches of inquiry. Secondly, we shall sketch briefly the history of ethics in so far as the various stages of its development bear upon and prepare the way for Christian ethics, indicating also the subsequent course of ethical speculation. Thirdly, we shall give some account of Biblical ethics; treating first of the main moral ideas contained in the Old Testament, and enumerating, secondly, the general principles and leading characteristics which underlie the ethical teaching of the New Testament.
I. Nature and Function of Ethics.
Ethics is that branch of philosophy which is concerned with human character and conduct. It deals with man, not so much as a subject of knowledge, as a source of action. It has to do with life or personality in its inward dispositions, outward manifestations and social relations. It was Aristotle who first gave to this study its name and systematic form. According to the Greek signification of the term, it is the science of customs (ethika, from ethos, "custom," "habit," "disposition"). But inasmuch as the words "custom" and "habit" seem to refer only to outward manners or usages, the mere etymology would limit the nature of the inquiry. The same limitation exists in the Latin designation, "moral," since mores concerns primarily manners.
Men live before they reflect, and act before they examine the grounds of action. So long as there is a congruity between the habits of an individual or a people and the practical requirements of life, ethical questions do not occur. It is only when difficulties arise and new problems appear as to right and duty in which the existing customs of life offer no solution, that doubt awakes, and with doubt reflection upon the actual morality which governs life. It is when men begin to call in question their past usages and institutions and to read-just their attitude to old traditions and new interests that ethics appears. Ethics is not morality but reflection upon morality. When, therefore, Aristotle, following Socrates and Plato, employed the term, he had in view not merely a description of the outward life of man, but rather the sources of action and the objects as ends which ought to guide him in the proper conduct of life. According to the best usage the names Moral Philosophy and Ethics are equivalent and mean generally the rational explanation of our nature, actions and relations as moral and responsible beings. Ethics therefore may be defined as the systematic study of human character, and its function is to show how human life must be fashioned to realize its end or purpose.
But accepting this general definition, how, it may be asked, can we speak of a science of conduct at all? Has not science to do with necessary truths, to trace effects from causes, to formulate general laws according to which these causes act, and to draw inevitable and necessary consequences? But is not character just that concerning which no definite conclusions can be predicted? Is not conduct, dependent as it is on the human will, just that which cannot be explained as the resultant of calculable forces? If the will is free then you cannot decide beforehand what line it will take, or predict what shape character must assume. The whole conception of a science of ethics, it is contended, must fall to the ground if we admit an invariable and calculable element in conduct. But this objection is based partly upon a misconception of the function of science and partly upon a too narrow classification of the sciences. Science has not only to do with cause and effect and the laws according to which phenomena actually occur. Science seeks to deal systematically with all truths that are presented to us; and there is a large class of truths not belonging indeed to the realm of natural and physical events which, however, may be studied and correlated. Ethics is not indeed concerned with conduct, as a natural fact, as something done here and now following from certain causes in the past and succeeded by certain results in the future. It is concerned with judgments upon conduct--the judgment that such conduct is right or wrong as measured by a certain standard or end. Hence, a distinction has been made between the physical sciences and what are called normative sciences.
The natural or physical sciences are concerned simply with phenomena of Nature or mind, actual occurrences which have to be analyzed and classified. The normative sciences, on the other hand, have to do not with mere facts in time or space, but with judgments about these facts, with certain standards or ends (norms, from norma, "a rule") in accordance with which the facts are to be valued. Man cannot be explained by natural law. He is not simply a part of the world, a link in the chain of causality. When we reflect upon his life and his relation to the world we find that he is conscious of himself as an end and that he is capable of forming purposes, of proposing new ends and of directing his thoughts and actions with a view to the attainment of these ends, and making things subservient to him. Such an end or purpose thus forms a norm for the regulation of life; and the laws which must be observed for the attainment of such an end form the subjects of a normal or normative science. Ethics therefore has to do with the norm or standard of right or wrong, and is concerned primarily with the laws which regulate our judgments and guide our actions.
4. Relation to Cognate Sciences:
Man is of course a unity, but it is possible to view his self-consciousness in three different aspects, and to regard his personality as constituted of an intellectual, sentient and volitional element. Roughly corresponding to these three aspects, one in reality but separable in thought, there arise three distinct though interdependent mental sciences: metaphysics, which has to do with man's relation to the universe of which he forms a part; psychology, which deals with the nature, constitution and evolution of his faculties and feelings as a psychical being; and ethics, which treats of him as a volitional being, possessing will or determining activity.
Ethics, though distinct from, is closely connected with metaphysics on the one hand, and psychology on the other. If we take metaphysics in its widest sense as including natural theology and as positing some ultimate end to the realization of which the whole process of the world is somehow a means, we may easily see how it is a necessary presupposition or basis of ethical inquiry. The world as made and governed by and for an intelligent purpose, and man as a part of it, having his place and function in a great teleological cosmos, are postulates of the moral life and must be accepted as a basis of all ethical study. The distinction between ethics and metaphysics did not arise at once. In early Greek philosophy they were closely united. Even now the two subjects cannot be completely dissociated. Ethics invariably runs back into metaphysics, or at least into theology, and in every philosophical system in which the universe is regarded as having an ultimate end or good, the good of human beings is conceived as identical with or included in the universal good (see Ziegler, Gesch. der christlichen Ethik; also Sidgwick, History of Ethics).
On the other hand ethics is closely associated with, though distinguishable from, psychology. Questions of conduct inevitably lead to inquiries as to certain states of the agent's mind, for we cannot pronounce an action morally good or bad until we have investigated the qualities of intention, purpose, motive and disposition which lie at the root of the action. Hence, all students of ethics are agreed that the main object of their investigation must belong to the psychical side of human life, whether they hold that man's ultimate end is to be found in the sphere of pleasure or they maintain that his well-being lies in the realization of virtue. Questions as to existence, evolution and adequacy of a moral faculty (see CONSCIENCE ); as to the relation of pleasure and desire; as to the meaning of validity of voluntary action; as to the historical evolution of moral customs and ideals, and man's relation at each stage of his being to the social, political and religious institutions, belong indeed to a science of ethics, but they have their roots in psychology as a study of the human soul.
The very existence of a science of ethics depends upon the answers which psychology gives to such questions. If, for example, we decide that there is no such faculty in man as conscience and that the moral sense is but a natural manifestation which has gradually evolved with the physical and social evolution of man (Darwin, Spencer); or if we deny the self-determining power of human beings and assume that the freedom of the will is a delusion, or in the last resort a negligible element, and treat man as one of the many phenomena of a physical universe, then indeed we may continue to speak of a science of the moral life as some naturalistic writers do, but such a science would not be a science of ethics as we understand it. Whatever be our explanation of conscience and freedom, no theory as to these powers must depersonalize man, and we may be justly suspicious of any system of psychology which undermines the authority of the moral sense or paves the way for a complete irresponsibility.
The "Ought."
Ethics is based on the assumption that man is a person possessing rights and having duties--responsible therefore for his intentions as well as his actions. The idea of personality involves not only a sense of accountability but carries with it also the conception of a law to which man is to conform, an ideal at which he is to aim. The end of life with all its implications forms the subject of ethics. It is concerned not simply with what a man is or does, but more particularly with what he should be and do. Hence, the word "ought" is the most distinctive term of ethics. The "ought" of life constitutes at once the end or ideal and the law of man. It comprises end, rule and motive of action. Thus the problem of ethics comes to be regarded as the highest good of man, the to agathon, of the Greeks, the summum bonum of Latin philosophy.
5. Relation of Christian Ethics to Moral Philosophy:
If ethics generally is based upon the postulates of philosophy and psychology, and at each stage of human consciousness grounds its principles of life upon the view of the world and of man to which it has attained, Christian ethics presupposes the Christian view of life as revealed by Christ, and its definition must be in harmony with the Christian ideal. Christian ethics is the science of morals conditioned by Christianity, and the problems which it discusses are the nature, laws and duties of the moral life as dominated by the Supreme Good which Christians believe to have been revealed in and through the life and teaching of Jesus Christ. Christian ethics is thus a branch or particular application of general ethics. So far from being opposed to moral philosophy it is the inevitable outcome of the evolution of thought. For if the revelation of God through Christ is true, then it is a factor, and the greatest in life and destiny, which must condition man's entire outlook and give a new value to his aims and duties.
In Christianity we are confronted with the motive power of a great Personality entering into the current of human history, and by His preeminent spiritual force giving a direction to the moral life of man. This means that the moral life can only be understood by reference to the creative power of this Personality. If there is any place at all for a distinct science of Christian ethics, that place can be indicated only by starting from the ethical ideal embodied in Christ, and working out from that point a code of morality for the practical guidance of the Christian life. But while this truth gives to Christian ethics its distinctive character and preeminent worth, it neither throws discredit upon philosophical ethics nor separates the two sciences by any hard-and-fast lines. They have much in common. A large domain of conduct is covered by both. The so-called pagan virtues have their worth for Christian character and are in the line of Christian virtues. Man even in his natural state is constituted for the moral life and is not without some knowledge of right and wrong (Rom 1:20). The moral attainments of the ancients are not simply "splendid vices." Duty may differ in content, but it is of the same kind under every system. Purity is purity, and benevolence benevolence, and both are excellences, whether manifested in a heathen or a Christian. While therefore Christian ethics takes its point of departure from the revelation of God and the manifestation of man's possibilities in Christ, it accepts and uses the results of moral philosophy in so far as they throw light upon the fundamental facts of human nature. As a system of morals Christianity claims to be inclusive. It takes cognizance of all the data of consciousness, and assumes all ascertained truth as its own. It completes what is lacking in other systems in so far as their conclusions are based on an incomplete survey of facts. Christian morals, in short, deal with personality in its highest ranges of moral power and spiritual consciousness, and seek to interpret life by its greatest possibilities and loftiest attainments as they have been revealed in Christ.
As illustrating what has just been said two distinctive features of Christian morals may be noted, of which philosophical ethics takes little or no account:
(a) Christian ethics assumes a latent spirituality in man awaiting the Spirit of God to call it forth. "Human nature," says Newman Smyth, "has its existence in an ethical sphere and for moral ends of being." There is a natural capacity for ethical life to which man's whole constitution points. Matter itself may be said to exist ultimately for spirit, and the spirit of man for the Holy Spirit (compare Rothe, Theologische Ethik, I, 459). No theory of man's physical beginning can interfere with the assumption that man stands upon a moral plane and is capable of a life which shapes itself to spiritual ends. Whatever be man's history and evolution, he has from the beginning been made in God's image, and he bears the Divine impress in all the lineaments of his body and soul. His degradation cannot wholly obliterate his nobility, and his actual corruption bears witness to his possible holiness. Christian morality is therefore nothing else than the morality prepared from all eternity, and is but the highest realization of that which heathen virtue was striving after. This is the Pauline view of human nature. Jesus Christ, according to the apostle, is the end and consummation of the whole creation. Everywhere there is a capacity for Christ. Man is not simply what he now is, but all that he is yet to be (1 Cor 15:47-49).
(b) Connected with this peculiarity is another which further differentiates Christian ethics from philosophical--the problem of the re-creation of character. Speculative systems do not advance beyond the formation of moral requirements; they prescribe what ought ideally to be done or avoided. Christianity, on the other hand, is primarily concerned with the question, By what power can I achieve the right and the good? (compare Ottley, Christian Ideas and Ideals, 22). It regards human nature as in need of renewal and recovery. It points to a process by which character can be restored and transformed. It claims to be the power of God unto salvation to everyone that believeth (Rom 1:16). Christian ethics thus makes the twofold assumption, and in this its contrast to philosophical ethics is disclosed, that the ideal of humanity has been revealed in Jesus Christ and that in Him also there is supplied a power by which man may become his true self, all that his natural life gives promise of and potentially is.
Passing from a consideration of the data of Christian ethics to its method, we find that here again there is much that is common to philosophy and Christian morals. The method in both is the rational method. The Christian ideal, though given in Christ, has to be examined, analyzed and applied by the very same faculties as man employs in regard to speculative problems. All science must be furnished with facts, and its task is to give a consistent explanation of them. While the speculative thinker finds his facts in the constitution of the moral world at large, the Christian discovers his in Scripture, and more particularly in the teachings of Christ. But it is sufficient to point out that while the New Testament is largely occupied with ethical matters, there is no attempt at a scientific formulation of them. The materials of systematic treatment are there, but the task of coordinating and classifying principles is the work of the expositor. The data are supplied but these data require to be interpreted, unified and applied so as to form a system of ethics. Consequently in dealing with his facts, the same method must be employed by the Christian expositor as by the student of science. That is the method of rational inquiry and inductive procedure--the method imposed upon all mental problems by the essential nature of the mind itself. The authority to which Christian ethics appeals is not an external oracle which imposes its dictates in a mechanical way. It is an authority embodied in intelligible forms and appealing to the reasoning faculties of man. Christian ethics is not a cut-and-dried, ready-made code. It has to be thought out by man and brought to bear, through the instrumentality of his thinking powers, upon all the relationships of life. According to the Protestant view, at least, ethics is no stereotyped compendium of rules which the Bible or the church supplies to save a man from the trouble of thinking. It is a complete misapprehension of the nature of Scripture and of the purpose of Christ's example and teaching to assume that they afford a mechanical standard which must be copied or obeyed in a slavish way. Christ appeals to the rational nature of man, and His words are life and spirit only as they are apprehended in an intelligent way and become by inner conviction and personal appropriation the principles of thought and action:
6. Relation of Christian Ethics to Dogmatics:
Within the domain of theology the two main constituents of Christian of teaching are dogmatics and ethics, or doctrine and morals. Though it is convenient to treat these separately, they really form a whole, and are but two sides of one subject. It is difficult to define their limits, and to say where dogmatics ends and ethics begins.
The distinction has sometimes been expressed by saying that dogmatics is a theoretic, while ethics is a practical science. It is true that ethics stands nearer to everyday life and deals with methods of practical conduct, while dogmatics is concerned with beliefs and treats of their origin and elucidation. But on the other hand ethics discusses thoughts as well as actions, and is interested in inner judgments not less than outward achievements. There is a practical side to all doctrine; and there is a theoretic side of all morals. In proportion as dogmatic theology becomes divorced from practical interest there is a danger that it may become mere pedantry. Even the most theoretic of sciences, metaphysics, while, as Novalis said, it bakes no bread, has its justification in its bearing upon life. On the other hand, ethics would lose all scientific value and would sink into a mere enumeration of duties if it had no dogmatic basis and did not draw its motives from beliefs. The common statement that dogmatics shows what we should believe and ethics what we should do is only approximately true and is inadequate. For moral laws and precepts are also objects of faith, and what we should believe involves a moral requirement and has a moral character.
Schleiermacher has been frequently charged with ignoring the differences between the two disciplines, but with scant justice; for while he regards the two studies as but different branches of Christian doctrine and while emphasizing their intimate connection, he by no means neglects their differences (compare Schleiermacher, Christliche Lehre, 1-24). Recent Christian moralists (Dorner, Martensen, Wuttke, Haering, Lemme) tend to accentuate the distinction and claim for them a separate discussion. The ultimate connection cannot indeed be overlooked without loss to both. It leads only to confusion to talk of a creedless morality, and the attempt to deal with moral questions without reference to their dogmatic implication will not only rob Christian ethics of its distinctive character and justification, but will reduce the exposition to a mere system of emotionalism. Dogmatics and ethics may be regarded as interdependent and mutually serviceable. On the one hand, ethics saves dogmatics from evaporating into unsubstantial speculation, and, by affording the test of life and workableness, keeps it upon the solid foundation of fact. On the other hand, dogmatics supplies ethics with its formative principles and normative standards, and preserves the moral life from degenerating into the vagaries of fanaticism or the apathy of fatalism.
While both sciences form the complementary sides of theology, and stand in the relation of mutual service, ethics presupposes dogmatics and is based upon its postulates. Dogmatics presents the essence, contents and object of the religious consciousness; ethics presents this consciousness as a power determining the human will (Wuttke). In the one, the Christian life is regarded from the standpoint of dependence on God; in the other, from the standpoint of human freedom. Dogmatics deals with faith in relation to God, and as the receptive organ of Divine grace; ethics considers it rather in its relation to man as a human activity, and as the organ of conduct (compare Lemme, Christliche Ethik, I, 15). Doctrine shows us how our adoption into the kingdom of God is the work of Divine love; ethics shows us how this knowledge of salvation manifests itself in love to God and our neighbor and must be worked out through all the relationships of life (compare Haering).
From this point of view we may see how dogmatics supplies to ethics certain postulates which may briefly be enumerated.
(a) The Christian Idea of God:
God is not merely a force or even a creator as He is presented in philosophy. Divine power must be qualified by what we term the moral attributes of God. We do not deny His omnipotence, but we look beyond it to "the love that tops the power, the Christ in God." Moreover we recognize a gradation in God's moral qualities: (a) benevolence or kindness; (b) more deeply ethical and in seeming contrast to His benevolence, Divine justice--not mere blind benevolence but a kindness which is wise and discriminating (compare Butler); (c) highest in the scale of Divine attributes, uniting in one comprehensive quality kindness and justice, stands Divine love or grace. The God whom dogmatics postulates to ethics is God in Christ.
(b) The Christian Doctrine of Sin.
It is not the province of ethics to discuss the origin of evil or propound a theory of sin. But it must see to it that the view it takes is consistent with the truths of revelation and in harmony with the facts of life. A false or inadequate conception of sin is as detrimental for ethics as it is for dogmatics, and upon our doctrine of evil depends very largely our view of life as to its difficulties and purposes, its trials and triumphs. Three views of sin have been held. According to some (e.g. the ancient Greeks) sin is simply a defect or shortcoming, a missing of the mark (hamartia, the active principle, or hamartema, the result); according to others, it is a disease, a thing latent in the constitution or at least an infirmity or limitation inherent in the flesh and resulting from heredity and environment (see EVOLUTION ).
While there is truth in both of these views, by themselves, each separately, or both in combination, is defective. They do not sufficiently take account of the personal self-determinative element in all sin. It is a misfortune, a fate from which the notion of guilt is absent. The Christian view implies these conceptions, but it adds its own distinctive note which gives to them their value. Sin is not merely a negative thing, it is something positive, an inward dominating force. It is not merely an imperfection, or want; it is an excess, a trespass. It is not simply an inherited and inherent malady; it is a self-chosen perversion. It is not inherent in the flesh or animal impulses and physical passions: it belongs rather to the mind and will. Its essence lies in selfishness. It is the deliberate choice of self in preference to God. It is personal and willful rebellion. It is to be overcome, therefore, not by the suppression of the body or the excision of the passions, but by the acceptance of a new principle of life and a transformation of the whole man. There are of course degrees and stages of wrongdoing, and there are compensating circumstances which must be taken into account in estimating the significance of evil; but in its last resort Christian ethics postulates the fact of sin and regards it as personal rebellion against the holiness of God, as the deliberate choice of self and the willful perversion of all the powers of man into instruments of unrighteousness.
(c) The Responsibility of Man:
A third postulate arises as a consequence from the Christian view of God and the Christian view of sin, namely, the responsibility of man. Christian ethics treats every man as accountable for his thoughts and actions, and therefore capable of choosing the good as revealed in Christ. While not denying the sovereignty of God or minimizing the mystery of evil and clearly recognizing the universality of sin, Christianity firmly maintains the doctrine of human freedom and accountability. An ethic would be impossible if, on the one side, grace were absolutely irresistible, and if, on the other, sin were necessitated, if at any single point wrongdoing were inevitable. Whatever be our doctrine on these subjects, ethics demands that freedom of the will be safeguarded.
At this point an interesting question emerges as to the possibility, apart from a knowledge of Christ, of choosing the good. Difficult as this question is, and though it was answered by Augustine and many of the early Fathers in the negative, the modern, and probably the more just, view is that we cannot hold mankind responsible unless we accord to all men the larger freedom. If non-Christians are fated to do evil, then no guilt can be imputed. History shows that a love for goodness has sometimes existed, and that many isolated acts of purity and kindness have been done, among people who have known nothing of the historical Christ. The New Testament recognizes degrees of depravity in nations and individuals and a measure of noble aspiration and earnest effort in ordinary human nature. Paul plainly assumes some knowledge and performance on the part of the heathen, and though he denounces their immorality in unsparing terms he does not affirm that pagan society was so utterly corrupt that it had lost all knowledge of moral good.
II. Historical Sketch of Ethics.
A comprehensive treatment of our subject would naturally include a history of ethics from the earliest times to the present. For ethics as a branch of philosophical inquiry partakes of the historical development of all thought, and the problems which it presents to our day can be rightly appreciated only in the light of certain categories and concepts--such as end, good, virtue, duty, pleasure, egoism and altruism--which have been evolved through the successive stages of the movement of ethical thoughts. All we can attempt here, however, is the baldest outline of the different epochs of ethical inquiry as indicating the preparatory stages which lead up to and find their solution in the ethics of Christianity.
All the great religions of the world--of India, Persia and Egypt--have had their ethical implicates, but these have consisted for the most part of loosely connected moral precepts or adages. Before the golden age of Greek philosophy there were no ethics in the strict sense. The moral consciousness of the Greeks takes its rise with the Sophists, and particularly with Socrates, who were the first to protest against the long-established customs and traditions of their land. The so-called "wise men" were in part moralists, but their sayings are but isolated maxims presenting no unity or connection. Philosophy proper occupied itself primarily with purely metaphysical or ontological questions as to the nature of being, the form and origin and primal elements of the world. It was only when Greek religion and poetry had lost their hold upon the cultured and the beliefs of the past had come to be doubted, that questions as to the meaning of life and conduct arose.
Already the Sophists had drawn attention to the vagueness and inconsistency of common opinion, and had begun to teach the art of conduct, but it was Socrates who, as it was said, first brought philosophy down from heaven to the sphere of the earth and directed men's minds from merely natural things to human life. He was indeed the first moral philosopher, inasmuch as, while the Sophists talked about justice and law and temperance, they could not tell, when pressed, what these things were. The first task of Socrates, therefore, was to expose human ignorance. All our confusion and disputes about good arise, says. Socrates, from want of clear knowledge. He aimed, therefore, at producing knowledge, not merely for its own sake, but because he believed it to be the ground of all right conduct. Nobody does wrong willingly. Let a man know what is good, that is, what is truly beneficial, and he will do it. Hence, the famous Socratic dictum, "Virtue is knowledge and vice is ignorance." With all his intellectualism Socrates was really a hedonist, believing that pleasure was the ultimate end of life. For it must not be imagined that he conceived of knowledge of virtue as distinct from interest. Everyone naturally seeks the good because the good is really identified with his happiness. The wise man is necessarily the happy man, and hence, "to know one's self" is to learn the secret of well-being.
While Socrates was the first to direct attention to the nature of virtue, his one-sided and fragmentary conception of it received a more systematic treatment from Plato, who attempted to define the nature and end of man by his place in the cosmos. Plato thus brought ethics into intimate connection with metaphysics. He conceived an ideal world in which everything earthly and human had its prototype. The human soul is derived from the world-soul and, like it, is a mixture of two elements. On the one side, in virtue of reason, it participates in the world of ideas, or the life of God; and on the other, by virtue of its animal impulses, it partakes of the world of decay, the corporeal world. These two dissimilar parts are connected by an intermediate element, which Plato calls thumos, embracing courage, the love of honor and the affections of the heart--a term which may be translated by the will. The constitution of the inner man is manifested in his outward organization. The head is the seat of reason, the breast of the heart and the affections, and the lower part of the body of the organs of animal desire. If we ask, Who is the just man? Plato answers, The man in whom the three elements just mentioned harmonize. We thus arrive at the scheme of the so-called "cardinal virtues" which have persisted through all ages and have given direction to all ethical discussion--wisdom, courage, temperance which, in combination, give us justice. It will thus be observed that virtue is no longer simply identified with knowledge; but another form of bad conduct besides ignorance is assumed, namely, the internal disorder and conflict of the soul, in which the lower impulses war with the higher. This, it will be seen, is a distinct advance on the one-sided position of Socrates; but in his attempt to reconcile the two movements in the conflict of life, Plato does not succeed in overcoming the duality. The inner impulses are ever dragging man down, and man's true well-being lies in the attainment of the life of reason. But though there are gleams of a higher solution in Plato, as a rule he falls back upon the idea that virtue is to be attained only by the suppression of the animal passions and the mortifying of the lower life. Plato affords us also the primal elements of social ethics. Morality as conceived by him is not something belonging merely to the individual, but has its full realization in the state. Man is indeed but-a type of the larger cosmos, and it is not as an individual but as a citizen that he is capable of realizing his true life.
The ethics of Aristotle, while it completes, does not essentially differ from that of Plato. He is the first to treat of the subject formally as a science, which assumes in his hands a division of politics. For, as he says, man is really "a social animal"; and, even more decisively than Plato, he treats of man as a part of society. Aristotle begins his great work on ethics with the discussion of the chief good, which he declares to be happiness or well-being. Happiness does not consist, however, in sensual pleasure, or even in the pursuit of honor, but in a life of well-ordered contemplation, "an activity of the soul in accordance with reason" (Nic. Eth., I, chapter v). But to reach the goal of right thinking and right doing, both favorable surroundings and proper instruction are required. Virtue is not virtue until it is a habit, and the only way to become virtuous is to practice virtue. It will thus be seen that Aristotle balances the one-sided emphasis of Socrates and Plato upon knowledge by the insistence upon habit. Activity must be combined with reason. The past and the present, environment and knowledge, must both be acknowledged as elements in the making of life. The virtues are thus habits, but habits of deliberate choice. Virtue is therefore an activity which at every point seeks to strike the mean between two opposite excesses. Plato's list of virtues had the merit of simplicity, but Aristotle's, though fuller, lacks system and consists generally of right actions which are determined in reference to two extremes. One defect which strikes a modern is that among the virtues benevolence is not recognized except obscurely as a form of liberality; and in general the gentler self-sacrificing virtues so prominent in Christianity have no place. The virtues. are chiefly aristocratic and are impossible for a slave. Again while Aristotle did well, in opposition to previous philosophy, to recognize the function of habit, it must be pointed out that habit of itself cannot make a man virtuous. Mere habit may be a hindrance and not a help to higher attainment. You cannot reduce morality to a succession of customary acts. But the main defect of Aristotle's treatment of virtue is that he regards the passions as wholly irrational and immoral. He does not see that passion in this sense can have no mean. If you may have too much of a good thing, you cannot have even a little of a bad thing. In man the desires and impulses are never purely irrational. Reason enters into all his appetites and gives to the body and all the physical powers an ethical value and a moral use. We do not become virtuous by curbing the passions but by transfiguring them into the vehicle of good. Aristotle, not less than Plato, is affected by the Greek duality which makes an antithesis between reason and impulse, and imparts to the former an external supremacy.
The two conflicting elements of reason and impulse which neither Plato nor Aristotle succeeded in harmonizing ultimately gave rise to two opposite interpretations of the moral life. The Stoics selected the rational nature as the true guide to an ethical system, but they gave to it a supremacy so rigid as to threaten the extinction of the affections. The Epicureans, on the other hand, seizing the doctrine that happiness is the chief good, so accentuated the emotional side of nature as to open the door for all manner of sensual enjoyment. Both agree in determining the happiness of the individual as the final goal of moral conduct. It, is not necessary to dwell upon the particular tenets of Epicurus and his followers. For though both Epicureanism and Stoicism, as representing the chief tendencies of ethical inquiry, have exercised incalculable influence upon speculation and practical morals of later ages, it is the doctrines of Stoicism which have more specially come into contact with Christianity.
Without dwelling upon the stoic conception of the world, according to which the universe was a whole, interpenetrated and controlled by an inherent spirit, and the consequent view of life as proceeding from God and being in all its parts equally Divine, we may note that the Stoics, like Plato and Aristotle, regarded the realization of man's natural purpose as the true well-being or highest good. This idea they formulated into a principle: "Life according to Nature." The wise man is he who strives to live in agreement with his rational nature in all the circumstances of life. The law of Nature is to avoid what is hurtful and strive for what is appropriate; and pleasure arises as an accompaniment when a being obtains that which is fitting. Pleasure and pain are, however, to be regarded as mere accidents or incidents of life and to be met by the wise man with indifference. He alone is free, the master of himself and the world, who acknowledges the absolute supremacy of reason and makes himself independent of earthly desires. This life of freedom is open to all, for all men are equal, members of one great body. The slave may be as free as the consul and each can make the world his servant by living in harmony with it.
There is a certain sublimity in the ethics of Stoicism. It was a philosophy which appealed to noble minds and "it inspired nearly all the great characters of the early Roman empire and nerved every attempt to maintain the dignity and freedom of the human soul" (Lecky, History of European Morals, I, chapter ii). We cannot, however, be blind to its defects. With all their talk of Divine immanence and providence, it was nothing but an impersonal destiny which the Stoics recognized as governing the universe. "Harmony with Nature" was simply a sense of proud self-sufficiency. Stoicism is the glorification of reason, even to the extent of suppressing all emotion. It has no real sense of sin. Sin is un-reason, and salvation lies in the external control of the passions, in indifference and apathy begotten of the atrophy of desire. The great merit of the Stoics is that they emphasized inner moral integrity as the one condition of all right action and true happiness, and in an age of degeneracy insisted on the necessity of virtue. In its preference for the joys of the inner life and its scorn of the delights of sense; in its emphasis upon duty and its advocacy of a common humanity, together with its belief in the direct relation of each human soul to God, Stoicism, as revealed in the writings of a Seneca, a Marcus Aurelius and an Epictetus, not only showed how high paganism at its best could reach, but proved in a measure a preparation for Christianity with whose practical tenets, in spite of its imperfections, it had much in common.
That there are remarkable affinities between Stoicism and Pauline ethics has frequently been pointed out. The similarity both in language and sentiment can scarcely be accounted for by mere coincidence. There were elements in Stoic philosophy which Paul would not have dreamed of assimilating, and features with which he could have no sympathy. The pantheistic view of God and the material conception of the world, the self-conscious pride, the absence of all sense of sin and need of pardon, the temper of apathy and the unnatural suppression of feelings--these were features which could not but rouse in the apostle's mind strong antagonism. But on the other hand there were certain well-known characteristics of a nobler order in Stoic morality which we may believe Paul found ready to his hand, ideas which he did not hesitate to incorporate in his teaching and employ in the service of the gospel. Without enlarging upon this line of thought (compare Alexander, Ethics of Paul), of these we may mention the immanence of God as the pervading cause of all life and activity; the idea of wisdom or knowledge as the ideal of man; the conception of freedom as the prerogative of the individual; and the notion of brotherhood as the goal of humanity.
It will be possible only to sketch in a few rapid strokes the subsequent development of ethical thought. After the varied life of the early centuries had passed, Christian ethic (so prominent in the Gospels and Epistles), like Christian theology, fell under the blight of Gnostieism (Alexandrian philosophy; compare Hatch, Hibbert Lectures) and latterly, of Scholasticism. Christian truth stiffened into a cumbrous catalogue of ecclesiastical observances. In the early Fathers (Barnabas, Clement, Origen, Gregory), dogmatic and ethical teaching were hardly distinguished. Cyprian discussed moral questions from the standpoint of church discipline.
The first real attempt at a Christian ethic was made by Ambrose, whose treatise on the Duties is an imitation of Cicero's work of the same title. Even Augustine, notwithstanding his profound insight into the nature of sin, treats of moral questions incidentally. Perhaps the only writers among the schoolmen, except Alcuin (Virtues and Vices), who afford anything like elaborate moral treatises, are Abelard (Ethica, or Scito te Ipsum), Peter Lombard (Sentences), and, above all, Thomas Aquinas (Summa, II).
Emancipation from a legal dogmatism first came with the Reformation which was in essence a moral revival. The relation of God and man came to be re-stated under the inspiration of Biblical truth, and the value and rights of man as man, so long obscured, were disclosed. The conscience was liberated and Luther became the champion of individual liberty.
Descartes and Spinoza.
The philosophical writers who most fully express in the domain of pure thought the protestant spirit are Descartes and Spinoza, with whom speculation with regard to man's distinctive nature and obligations took a new departure. Without following the fortunes of philosophy on the continent of Europe, which took a pantheistic form in Germany and a materialistic tone in France (though Rousseau directed the thought of Europe to the constitution of man), we may remark that in England thought assumed a practical complexion, and on the basis of the inquiries of Locke, Berkeley and Hume into the nature and limits of the human understanding, the quest. ions as to the source of moral obligation and the faculty of moral judgment came to the front.
British moralists may be classified mainly cording to their views on this subject. Beginning with Hobbes, who maintained that man was naturally selfish and that all his actions were self-regarding, Cudworth, More, Wallaston, Shaftesbury, Hutchison, Adam Smith and others discussed the problem, with varying success, of the relation of individual and social virtues, agreeing generally that the right balance between the two is due' to moral sense which, like taste or perception of beauty, guides us in things moral. All these intuitional writers fall back upon a native selfish instinct. Selfishness, disguise it as we may, or, as it came to be called, utility, is really the spring and standard of action. Butler in his contention for the supremacy and uniqueness of conscience took an independent but scarcely more logical attitude. Both he and all the later British moralists, Paley, Bentham, Mill, suffer from a narrow, artificial psychology which conceives of the various faculties as separate and independent elements lying in man.
Utilitarianism is a scheme of consequences which finds the moral quality of conduct in the effects and feelings created in the subject. With all their differences of detail the representatives of theory are at one in regarding the chief end of man as happiness. Bentham and Mill made the attempt to deduce benevolence from the egoistic startingpoint. "No reason can be given," says Mill (Utilitarianism, chapter iv), "why the general happiness is desirable except that each person .... desires his own happiness .... and the general happiness therefore is a good to the aggregate of all persons." Late utilitarians, dissatisfied with this non-sequitur and renouncing the dogma of personal pleasure, maintain that we ought to derive universal happiness because reason bids us (compare Sidgwick, Methods of Ethics,III , xiii). But what, we may ask, is this reason, and why should I listen to her voice?
The intuitional theory has more recently allied itself with the hypothesis of organic evolution. "These feelings of self-love and benevolence are really," says Spencer, "the products of development. The natural instincts and impulses to social good, though existent in a rudimentary animal form, have been evolved through environment, heredity and social institutions to which man through his long history has been subject." But this theory only carries the problem farther back, for, as Green well says (Proleg. to Ethics), "that countless generations should have passed during which a transmitted organism was progressively modified by reaction on its surroundings till an eternal consciousness could realize itself .... might add to the wonder, but it could not alter the results."
The great rival of the pleasure-philosophy is that which has been styled "duty for duty's sake." This position was first taken by Kant whose principle of the "Categorical Imperative" utterly broke down theory of "pleasure for pleasure's sake." For Kant, conscience is simply practical reason; and its laws by him are reduced to unity. Reason, though limited in its knowledge of objects to phenomena of the senses, in the region of practice transcends the phenomenal and attains the real. The autonomy of the will carries us beyond the phenomenal into the supersensible world. Here the "Categorical Imperative" or moral law utters its "thou shalt" and prescribes' a principle of conduct irrespective of desire or ulterior end. In accordance with the nature of the Categorical Imperative, the formula of all morality is, "Act from a maxim at all times fit for law universal" (Kritik d. praktischen Vernunft and Grundlage zur Metaphysik der Sitten).
This principle is, however, defective. For while it determines the subjective or formal side of duty, it tells us nothing of the objective side, of the content of duty. We may learn from Kant the grandeur of duty in the abstract and the need of obedience to it, but we do not learn what duty is. Kant's law remains formal, abstract and contentless, without relation to the matter of practical life.
To overcome this abstraction, to give content to the law of reason and find its realization in the institutions and relationships of life and society, has been the aim of the later idealistic philosophy which starts from Kant.
Following Fichte, for whom morality is action according to the ideas of reason--selfconsciousness finding itself in and through a world of deeds--Hegel starts with the Idea as the source of all reality, and develops the conception of Conscious Personality which, by overcoming the antithesis of impulse and thought, gradually attains to the full unity and realization of self in the consciousness of the world and of God. The law of Right or of all ethical ideal is, "Be a person and respect others as persons" (Hegel, Philosophic des Rechtes, section 31). These views have been worked out in recent British and American works of speculative ethics by Green, Bradley, Caird, McTaggart, Harris, Royce, Dewey, Watson.
Man as a self is rooted in an infinite self or personality. Our individual self-consciousness is derived from and maintained by an infinite eternal and universal self-consciousness. Knowledge is, therefore, but the gradual discovery of mind in things, the progressive realization of the world as the self-manifestation of an infinite Personality with whom the finite intelligence of man is one. Hence, morality is the gradual unfolding of an eternal purpose whose whole is the perfection of man.
(2) Watchwords: Pleasure and Duty.
We have thus seen that in the history of ethics two great rival watchwords have been sounded--pleasure and duty, or, to put it another way, egoism and altruism. Both have their justification, yet each taken separately is abstract and one-sided. The problem of ethics is how to harmonize without suppressing these two extremes, how to unite social duty and individual right in a higher unity. We have seen that philosophical ethics has sought a synthesis of these conflicting moments in the higher and more adequate conception of human personality--a personality whose ideals and activities are identified with the eternal and universal personality of God. Christianity also recognizes the truth contained in the several types of ethical philosophy which we have passed under review, but it adds something which is distinctively its own, and thereby gives a new meaning to happiness and to duty, to self and to others.
Christian synthesis:
Christianity also emphasizes the realization of personality with all that it implies as the true goal of man; but while Christ bids man "be perfect as God is perfect," He shows us that we only find ourselves as we find ourselves in others; only by dying do we live; and only through profound self-surrender and sacrifice do we become ourselves and achieve the highest good.
III. Principles and Characteristics of Biblical Ethics.
The sketch of the history of ethics just offered, brief as it necessarily is, may serve to indicate the ideas which have shaped modern thought and helped toward the interpretation of the Christian view of life which claims to be the fulfillment of all human attempts to explain the highest good. We now enter upon the third division of our subject which embraces a discussion generally of Biblical ethics, dealing first with the ethics of the Old Testament and next with the leading ideas of the New Testament.
1. Ethics of the Old Testament:
The gospel of Christ stands in the closest relation with Hebrew religion, and revelation in the New Testament fulfils and completes the promise given in the Old Testament. We have seen that the thinkers of Greece and Rome have contributed much to Christendom, and have helped to interpret Bible teaching with regard to truth and duty; but there is no such inward relation between them as that which connects Christian ethics with Old Testament morality. Christ himself, and still more the apostle Paul, assumed as a substratum of his teaching the revelation which had been granted to the Jews. The moral and religious doctrines which were comprehended under the designation of "the Law" formed for them, as Paul said (Gal 3:24,25), a paidagogos, or servant whose function it was to lead them to the school of Christ. In estimating the special character of Old Testament ethics, we are not concerned with questions as to authenticity and dates of the various books, nor with the manifold problems raised by modern Biblical criticism. While not forgetting the very long period which these books cover, involving changes of belief and life and embracing successive stages of political society, it is possible to regard the Old Testament simply as a body of writings which represent the successive ethical ideas of the Hebrews as a people.
(1) Religious Characteristics of Hebrew Ethics.
At the outset we are impressed by the fact that the moral ideal of Judaism was distinctly religious. The moral obligations were conceived as Divine commands and the moral law as a revelation of the Divine will. The religion was monotheistic. At first Yahweh may have been regarded merely as a tribal Deity, but gradually this restricted view gave place to a wider conception of God as the God of all men; and as such He was presented by the later prophets. God was for the Jew the supreme source and author of the moral law, and throughout his history duty was embodied in the Divine will. Early in the Pentateuch the note of law is struck, and the fundamental elements of Jewish morality are embedded in the story of Eden and the Fall. God's commandment is the criterion and measure of man's obedience. Evil which has its source and head in a hostile though subsidiary power consists in violation of Yahweh's will.
First among the various stages of Old Testament ethic must be mentioned the Mosaic legislation centering in the Decalogue (Ex 20; Dt 5). Whether the Ten Commandments issue from the time of Moses, or are a later summary of duty, they hold a supreme and formative place in the moral teaching of the Old Testament. All, including even the 4th, are purely moral enactments. But they are largely negative, only the 5th rising to positive duty. They are also chiefly external, regulative of outward conduct, forbidding acts but not taking note of intent and desire. The 6th and 7th commandments protect the rights of persons, while the 8th guards outward property. Though these laws may be shown to have their roots and sanctions in the moral consciousness of mankind and as such are applicable to all times and all men, it is clear that they were at first conceived by the Israelites to be restricted in their scope and practice to their own tribes.
A further factor in the ethical education of Israel arose from the civil laws of the land. The Book of the Covenant (Ex 20 through 23), as revealing a certain advance in political legislation and jurisprudence, may be regarded as of this kind. Still the hard legal law of retaliation--"an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth"--discloses a barbarous conception of right. But along with the more primitive enactments of revenge and stern justice there are not wanting provisions of a kindlier nature, such as the law of release, the protection of the fugitive, the arrangements for the gleaner and the institution of the Year of Jubilee.
Closely connected with the civil laws must be mentioned the ceremonial laws as an element in the moral life of Israel. If the civil laws had reference to the relation of man to his fellows, the ceremonial laws referred rather to the relation of man to God. The prevailing idea with regard to God, next to that of sovereign might, was holiness or separateness. The so-called Priestly Code, consisting of a number of ceremonial enactments, gradually took its place alongside of the Mosaic law, and was established to guard the being of God and the persons of the worshippers from profanation. These had to do (a) with sacrifices and offerings and forms of ritual which, while they typified and preshadowed the ideas of spiritual sanctity, often degenerated into superstitious practices (compare Am 5:25,26; Hos 6:6; Isa 1:11-13); (b) commands and prohibitions with regard to personal deportment--"meats and drinks and divers washings." Some of these had a sanitary significance; others guarded the habits of daily life from heathen defilement.
The dominant factor of Old Testament ethics lay in the influence of the prophets. They and not the priests were the great moralists of Israel. They are the champions of righteousness and integrity in political life, not less than of purity in the individual. They are the witnesses for God and the ruthless denouncers of all idolatry and defection from Him. They comment upon the social vices to which a more developed people is liable. They preach a social gospel and condemn wrongs done by man to man. Government and people are summoned to instant amendment and before the nation is held up a lofty ideal. The prophets are not only the, preachers, but also the philosophers of the people, and they direct men's minds to the spiritual and ideal side of things, inveighing against worldliness and materialism.
Under their reflection, theories as to the origin and nature of evil begin to emerge, and the solemnity and worth of life are emphasized. While on the one hand the sense of individual responsibility is dwelt upon, on the other the idea of a hereditary taint of soul is developed, and it is shown that the consequences of sin may affect even the innocent. A man may inherit suffering and incur penalties, not apparently through any fault of his own, but simply by reason of his place in the solidarity of the race. Problems like these awaken deep perplexity which finds a voice not only in the Prophets but also in the Book of Job and in many of the Psalms. The solution is sought in the thought that God works through evil, and by its effects evolves man's highest good. These conceptions reach their climax in the Second Isa, and particularly in chapter 53. God is constantly represented as longing to pardon and reinstate man in His favor; and the inadequacy of mere ceremonial as well as the failure of all material means of intercourse with Yahweh are repeatedly dwelt upon as preparing the way for the doctrine of salvation. In the Book of Pss--the devotional manual of the people reflecting the moral and religious life of the nation at various stages of its development--the same exalted character of God as a God of righteousness and holiness, hating evil and jealous for devotion, the same profound scorn of sin and the same high vocation of man are prevalent.
Without dwelling at length on the ethical ideas of the other writings of the Old Testament--the Books of Wisdom, Proverbs, Job, Ecclesiastes--we may remark that the teaching is addressed more to individuals than prophecy is; while not being particularly lofty it is healthy and practical, shrewd, homely common sense. While the motives appealed to are not always the highest and have regard frequently to earthly prosperity and worldly policy, it must not be overlooked that moral practice is also frequently allied with the fear of God, and the fight choice of wisdom is represented as the dictate of piety not less than of prudence.
It is to the sapiential books (canonical and apocryphal) that we owe the most significant ethical figures of the Old Testament--the wise man and the fool. The wise man is he who orders his life in accordance with the laws of God. The fool is the self-willed man, whose life, lacking principle, fails of success. The nature of wisdom lies not in intellectual knowledge so much as in the control of passion and the prudent regulation of desire. The idea of human wisdom is connected in these books with the sublime conception of Divine wisdom which colors both them and the Psalms. In some of the finest passages, Wisdom is personified as the counselor of God in the creation of the world (Prov 8; The Wisdom of Solomon 10; Job 28), or the guide which guards the destinies of man (The Wisdom of Solomon 10:15 ff).
If the sapiential books are utilitarian in tone the Book of Ecclesiastes is pessimistic. The writer is impressed with the futility of life. Neither pursuit of knowledge nor indulgence in pleasure affords satisfaction. All is vanity. Yet there is an element of submission in this book which only escapes despair by a grim and stolid inculcation of obedience to Divine command.
In an article on the Ethics of the Bible some allusion ought to be made to the spirit of the apocryphal books, reflecting as they do the ideas of a considerable period of Jewish history immediately before and contemporaneous with the advent of Christ. While in general there is a distinct recognition of true moral life and a high regard for the moral law, there is no system of ethics nor even a prevailing ethical principle in these books. The collection presents the ideas of no one man or party, or even of one period or locality. The moral ideas of each book require to be considered separately (see special articles), and they ought to be studied in connection with the philosophy of Philo and generally with the speculation of Alexandria, upon which they exercised considerable influence. The Wisdom of Solomon is supposed by Pfieiderer and others to have affected the Hellenic complexion of Paul's thought and also to have colored the stoic philosophy.
The apocryphal books as a whole do not give prominence to the idea of an ancient covenant and are not dominated by the notion of a redemptive climax to which the other Old Testament books bear witness. As a consequence their moral teaching lacks the spirituality of the Old Testament; and there is an insistence upon outward works rather than inward disposition as essential to righteousness. While wisdom and justice are commended, there is a certain self-satisfaction and pride in one's own virtue, together with, on the part of the few select spirits which attain to virtue, a corresponding disparagement of and even contempt for the folly of the many. In Sirach especially this tone of self-righteous complacency is observable. There is a manifest lack of humility and sense of sin, while the attainment of happiness is represented as the direct result of personal virtue (Sirach 14:14 ff).
The Book of The Wisdom of Solomon shows traces of neo-Platonic influences and recognizes the four Platonic virtues (8:7) and while admitting the corruption of all men (9:12 ff) attributes the causes of evil to other sources than the will, maintaining the Greek dualism of body and soul and the inherent evil of the physical nature of man. The Book of Judith presents in narrative form a highly questionable morality. On the whole it must be recognized that the moral teaching of the Apocrypha is much below the best teaching of the Old Testament. While Sirach gives expression to a true piety, it manifests its want of depth in its treatment of sin and in the inculcation of merely prudential motives to goodness. In general the essence of love is unknown, and the moral temper is far inferior to the ethics of Jesus. It is a mundane morality that is preached. Hope is absent and righteousness is rewarded by long life and prosperity (Tobit). Legalism is the chief characteristic (Baruch), and Pharisaic ceremonialism on the one hand, and Sadducaic rationalism on the other are the natural and historical consequences of apocryphal teachings.
(2) Limitations of Old Testament Ethics.
In estimating the ethics of the Old Testament as a whole the fact must not be forgotten that it was preparatory, a stage in the progressive revelation of God's will. We are not surprised, therefore, that, judged by the absolute standard of the New Testament, the morality of the Old Testament comes short in some particulars. Both in intent and extent, in spirit and in scope, it is lacking.
The tendency to dwell upon the sufficiency of external acts rather than the necessity of inward disposition, may be remarked; though as time went on, particularly in the later Prophets and some of the Psalms, the need of inward purity is insisted upon. While the ideal both for the nation and the individual is an exalted one--"Be ye holy for I am holy"--the aspect in which the character of God is represented is sometimes stern if not repellent (Ex 24; Nu 14:18; Gen 18; 2 Sam 24:17). But at the same time there are not wanting more tender features (Isa 1:17; Mic 6:8), and the Divine Fatherhood finds frequent expression. Even though the penal code is severe and the ceremonial law stern, a gentler spirit shines through many of its provisions, and protection is afforded to the wage-earner, the poor and the dependent, while the regulations regarding slaves and foreigners and even lower animals are merciful (Dt 24:14,15; Jer 22:13,17; Mal 3:5; Dt 25:4).
Material motives:
Again we have already remarked that the motives to which the Old Testament appeals are often mercenary and material. Material prosperity plays an important part as an inducement to moral conduct, and the good which the pious patriarch contemplates is earthly plenty, something which will enrich himself and his family. At the same time we must not forget that the revelation of God's purpose is progressive, and His dealing with men educative. There is naturally therefore a certain accommodation of the Divine law to the various stages of moral apprehension of the Jewish people, and on the human side a growing sense of the meaning of life as well as an advancing appreciation of the nature of righteousness. Gradually the nation is being carried forward by the promise of material benefits to the spiritual blessings which they enshrine. If even in the messages of the prophets there is not wanting some measure of threats and penalties, we must remember the character of the people they were dealing with--a people wayward and stubborn, whose imaginations could scarcely rise above the material and the temporal. We must judge prophecy by its best, and we shall see that these penalties and rewards which undoubtedly occupy a prominent place in Old Testament ethics were but goads to spur the apathetic. They were not ends in themselves, nor mere arbitrary promises or threats, but instruments subservient to higher ideals.
With regard to the extent or application of the Hebrew ideal it must be acknowledged that here also Old Testament ethics is imperfect as compared with the universality of Christianity. God is represented as the God of Israel and not as the God of all men. It is true that a prominent commandment given to Israel is that which our Lord endorsed: "Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself" (Lev 19:18). The extent of the obligation, however, would seem to be restricted in the language immediately preceding it: "Thou shalt not take vengeance, nor bear any grudge against the children of thy people." It has been pointed out that the term rea` is of wider signification than the English word "neighbor," and expresses the idea of friend, and is applied to any person. The wider rendering is enforced by the fact that in Lev 19:33,14 the word "stranger" or "foreigner" is substituted for neighbor. The stranger is thus regarded as the special client of God and is commended to look to Him for protection. However this may be, in practice at least the Jews were not faithful to the humanitarianism of their law, and generally, in keeping with other races of antiquity, showed a tendency to restrict Divine favor within the limits of their own land and to maintain an attitude throughout their history of aloofness and repellent isolation toward foreigners. At the same time the obligation of hospitality was regarded as sacred and was practiced in early Hebrew life (Gen 18:1-9). Nor must we forget that whatever may have been the Jewish custom the promise enshrined in their revelation implies the unity of mankind (Gen 19:3), while several of the prophecies and Psalms look forward to a world-wide blessing (Isa 61; Ps 22:27; 48:2,10; 87). In Isa 54 we even read, "God of the whole earth shall he be called." "Everything," it has been said, "is definitely stated except the equality of all men in God's love." The morality of bare justice is also in some measure transcended. The universal Fatherhood of God, if not clearly stated, is implied in many passages, and in Second Isa and Hos there are most tender revelations of Divine mercy though it is mercy to Israel only. But we know that the apostle Paul drew the inference from God's treatment of Israel that His mercy and salvation would extend to all.
2. Outline of New Testament Ethics:
We are now prepared to indicate briefly the distinctive features of the ethics of Christianity. As this article is, however, professedly introductory, and as the ethics of Jesus forms the subject of a separate treatment (see ETHICS OF JESUS ), it will not be necessary to offer an elaborate statement of the subject. It will be sufficient to suggest the formative principles and main characteristics. What we have to say may conveniently be divided under three heads: (1) the Christian ideal; (2) the dynamic power; (3) the virtues, duties and spheres of Christian activity.
Before, however, entering upon these details, a few words may fittingly be said upon the relation of the ethics of Jesus to those of Paul. It has been recently alleged that a marked contrast is perceptible between the teaching of Jesus and that of Paul, and that there is a great gulf fixed between the Gospels and the Epistles. Jesus is a moralist, Paul a theologian. The Master is concerned with the conditions of life and conduct; the disciple is occupied with the elaboration of dogma. This view seems to us to be greatly exaggerated. No one can read the Epistles without perceiving the ethical character of a large portion of their teaching and noticing how even the great theological principles which Paul enunciates have a profound moral import. Nor does it seem to us that there is any radical difference in the ethical teaching of Christ and that of the Apostle.
Both lay emphasis on character, and the great words of Christ are the great words of Paul. The inmost spring of the new life of love is the same for both. The great object of the Pauline dialectic is to place man emptied of self in a condition of receptiveness before God. But this idea, fundamental in Paul, is fundamental also in the teaching of Jesus. It is the very first law of the kingdom. With it the Sermon on the Mount begins: "Blessed are the poor in spirit." If we analyze this great saying it surely yields the whole principle of the Pauline argument and the living heart of the Pauline religion. In perfect agreement with this is the fundamental importance assigned both by Jesus and Paul to faith. With both it is something more than mental assent or even implicit confidence in providence. It is the spiritual vision in man of the ideal, the inspiration of life, the principle of conduct.
Again the distinctive note of Christ's ethic is the inwardness of the moral law as distinguished from the externality of the cereMonial law. Almost in identical terms Paul insists upon the need of inward purity, the purity of the inner man of the heart. Once more both lay emphasis upon the fulfillment of our duties to our fellow-men, and both are at one in declaring that man owes to others an even greater debt than duty. Christ's principle is, "Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself"; Paul's injunction is "Owe no man anything but to love one another." Christ transforms morality from a routine into a life; and with Paul also goodness ceases to be a thing of outward rule and becomes the spontaneous energy of the soul. For both all virtues are but the various expressions of a single vital principle. "Love is the fulfilling of the law." The dynamic of devotion according to Christ is, "God's love toward us"; according to Paul, "The love of Christ constraineth us."
Ideal of Life:
And if we turn from the motive and spring of service to the purpose of life, again we find substantial agreement: "Be ye perfect as your Father in heaven is perfect" is the standard of Christ; to attain to the perfect life--"the prize of the high calling of God in Christ"--is the aim of Paul.
Nor do they differ in their conception of the ultimate good of the world. Christ's ethical ideal, which He worked for as the realization of the object of His mission, was a redeemed humanity, a reestablishment of human society, which He designated "the kingdom of God." Paul with his splendid conception of humanity sees that kingdom typified and realized in the Risen Life of his Lord. It is by growing up in all things unto Him who is the Head that the whole body will be perfected in the perfection of its members. And this is what Paul means when he sums up the goal and ideal of all human faith and endeavor--"till we all attain .... unto a fullgrown man, unto .... the fullness of Christ" (Eph 4:13). Paul everywhere acknowledges himself to be a pupil of the Master and a teacher of His ways (1 Cor 4:17). Without pursuing this subject there can be no doubt that in their hidden depths and in their practical life the precepts of the apostle are in essential agreement with those of the Sermon on the Mount, and have a dommon purpose--the presenting of every man perfect before God (compare Alexander, Ethics of Paul).
The ethical ideal of the New Testament is thus indicated. The chief business of ethics is to answer the question, What is man's supreme good? For what should a man live? What, in short, is the ideal of life? A careful study of the New Testament discloses three main statements implied in what Christ designates "the kingdom of God": man's highest good consists generally in doing God's will and more particularly in the attainment of likeness to Christ and in the realization of human brotherhood--a relation to God, to Christ and to man. The first is the pure white light of the ideal; the second is the ideal realized in the one perfect life which is viewed as standard or norm; the third is the progressive realization of the ideal in the life of humanity which is the sphere of the new life.
Holiness as the fulfillment of the Divine will is, as we have seen, Christ's own ideal--Be ye perfect as your Father; and it is Paul's--This also we wish, even your perfection (2 Cor 13:11). The ideas of righteousness and holiness as the attributes of God are the features of the kingdom of God or of heaven, the realization of which Jesus continually set forth as the highest aim of man; and running through all the epistles of Paul the constant refrain is that ye might walk worthy of God who hath called you unto His kingdom and glory. To walk worthy of God, to fulfill His will in all sincerity and purity, is for the Christian as for the Jew the end of all morality. Life has a supreme worth and sacredness because God is its end. To be a man is to fulfill in his own person God's idea of humanity. Before every man, just because he is man with the touch of the Divine hand upon him and his Maker's end to serve, lies this ultimate goal of existence--the realization of the perfect life-according to the idea of God.
If Godlikeness or holiness is the end, Christlikeness is the norm or standard in which that end is presented in the Gospel. In Christianity God is revealed to us through Jesus Christ, and the abstract impersonal ideas of holiness and righteousness are transmuted into the features of a living personality whose spirit is to be reproduced in the lives of men. In two different ways Christ is presented in the New Testament as ideal. He is at once the Pattern and the Principle or Power of the new life.
(a) He is the Pattern of goodness which is to be reproduced in human lives. It would lead us to trench on the succeeding article if we were to attempt here a portrayal of the character of Jesus as it is revealed in the Gospels. We only note that it is characteristic of the New Testament writers that they do not content themselves with imaginative descriptions of goodness, but present a living ideal in the historical person of Jesus Christ.
(b) He is also Principle of the new life--not example only, but power--the inspiration and cause of life to all who believe (Eph 1:19,20). Paul says not, "Be like Christ," but "Have the mind in you which was also in Christ." The literal imitation of an example has but a limited reign. To be a Christian is not the mechanical work of a copyist. Kant goes the length of saying that "imitation finds no place in all morality" (Metaphysics of Ethics, section ii). Certainly the imitation of Christ as a test of conduct covers a quite inadequate conception of the intimate and vital relation Christ bears to humanity. "It is not to copy after Him," says Schultz (Grundriss d. evangelischen Ethik, 5), "but to let His life take form in us, to receive His spirit and make it effective, which is the moral task of the Christian." It is as its motive and creative power that Paul presents Him. "Let Christ be born in you." We could not even imitate Christ if He were not already within us. He is our example only because He is something more, the principle of the new life, the higher and diviner self of every man. "He is our life"; "Christ in us the hope of glory."
(3) Brotherhood and Unity of Man.
The emphasis hitherto has been laid on the perfection of the individual. But both Christ and His apostles imply that the individual is not to be perfected alone. No man finds himself till he finds his duties. The single soul is completed only in the brotherhood of the race. The social element is implied in Christ's idea of the Kingdom, and many of the apostolic precepts refer not to individuals but to humanity as an organic whole. The church is Christ's body of which individuals are the members, necessary to one another and deriving their life from the head. The gospel is social as well as individual, and the goal is the kingdom of God, the brotherhood of man. Paul proclaims the unity and equality before God of Greek and Roman, bond and free.
4. The Dynamic Power of the New Life:
In the dynamic power of the new life we reach the central and distinguishing feature of Christian ethics. Imposing as was the ethic of Greece, it simply hangs in the air. Plato's ideal state remains a theory only. Aristotle's "virtuous man" exists only in the mind of his creator. Nor was the Stoic more successful in making his philosophy a thing of actuality. Beautiful as these old-time ideals were, they lacked impelling force, the power to change dreams into realities. The problems which baffled Greek philosophy it is the glory of Christianity to have solved. Christian ethics is not a theory. The good has been manifested in a life. The Word was made flesh. It was a new creative force--a spirit given and received, to be worked out and realized in the actual life of common men.
(1) The Dynamic on Its Divine Side.
The problem with Paul was, How can man achieve that good which has been embodied in the life and example of Jesus Christ? Without entering into the details of this question it may be said at once that the originality of the gospel lies in this, that it not only reveals the good but discloses the power which makes the good possible in the hitherto unattempted derivation of the new life from a new birth under the influence of the Spirit of God. Following his Master, when Paul speaks of the new ethical state of believers he represents it as a renewal or rebirth of the Holy Spirit. It is an act of Divine creative power.
Without following out the Pauline argument we may say he connects the working of the Holy Spirit with two facts in the life of Christ, for him the most important in history--the death and resurrection of our Lord. Here we are in the region of dogmatics, and it does not concern us to present a theory of the atonement. All we have to do with is the fact that between man and the new life lies sin, which must be overcome and removed, both in the form of guilt and power, before reconciliation with God can be effected. The deed which alone meets the case is the sacrifice of Christ. In virtue of what Christ has achieved by His death a fundamentally new relationship exists. God and man are now in full moral accord and vital union.
But not less important as a factor in creating the new life is the resurrection. It is the seal and crown of the sacrifice. It was the certainty that He had risen that gave to Christ's death its sacrificial value. "If Christ be not risen ye are yet in your sins." The new creature is the work of Christ. But His creative power is not an external influence. It is an inner spirit of life. All that makes life life indeed--an exalted, harmonious and completed existence--is derived from the Holy Spirit through the working of the crucified risen Christ.
(2) The Dynamic on Its Human Side.
Possession of power implies obligation to use it. The force is given; it has to be appropriated. The spirit of Christ is not offered to free a man from the duties and endeavors of the moral life. Man is not simply the passive recipient of the Divine energy. He has to make it his own and work it out by an act of free resolution. When we inquire what constitutes the subjective or human element, we find in the New Testament two actions which belong to the soul entering upon the new world in Christ--repentance and faith. These are complementary and constitute what is commonly called conversion. Repentance in the New Testament is a turning away in sorrow and contrition from a life of sin and a breaking with evil under the influence of Christ. If repentance looks back and forsakes, faith looks forward and accepts. In general it is the outgoing of the whole man toward his Lord, the human power or energy by which the individual receives and makes his own the life in Christ. It is not merely intellectual acceptance or moral trust; it is above all appropriating energy. It is the power of a new obedience. As the principle of moral appropriation it has its root in personal trust and its fruit in Christian service. Faith, in short, is the characteristic attitude and action of the whole Christian personality in its relation to the spiritual good offered to it in Christ.
5. Virtues, Duties and Spheres of the New Life:
It but remains to indicate how this new power manifests itself in character and in practical conduct. Character is expressed in virtue, and duty is conditioned by station and relationships.
The systematic enumeration of the virtues is one of the most difficult tasks of ethics. Neither in ancient nor in modern times has complete success attended attempts at classification. Plato's list is too meager. Aristotle's lacks system and is marred by omission. Nowhere in Scripture is there offered a complete description of all the virtues that flow from faith. But by bringing Christ's words and the apostolic precepts together we have a rich and suggestive cluster (Mt 5; 6; Gal 5:22,23; Col 3:12,13; Phil 4:8; 1 Pet 2:18,19; 4:7,8; 2 Pet 15-8; 1 Jn 3; Jude). We may make a threefold classification:
The heroic virtues, sometimes called the cardinal, handed down from antiquity--wisdom, fortitude, temperance, justice. While these were accepted and dwelt upon, Christianity profoundly modified their character so that they became largely new creations. "The old moral currency was still kept in circulation, but it was gradually minted anew" (Strong).
The amiable virtues, which are not merely added on to the pagan, but being incorporated with them, give an entirely new meaning to those already in vogue. While Plato lays stress on the intellectual or heroic features of character, Christianity brings to the foreground the gentler virtues. Two reasons may have induced the Christian writers to dwell more on the self-effacing side of character: partly as a protest against the spirit of militarism and the worship of material power prevalent in the ancient world; and chiefly because the gentler self-sacrificing virtues more truly expressed the spirit of Christ. The one element in character which makes it beautiful and effective and Christlike is love--the element of sacrifice. Love evinces itself in humility which lays low all vaunting ambition and proud selfsufficiency. Closely allied to humility are meekhess and its sister, long-suffering--the attitude of the Christian in the presence of trial and wrong. With these again are connected contentment and patience and forbearance, gentle and kindly consideration for others. Lastly there is the virtue of forgiveness. For it is not enough to be humble and meek; we have a duty toward wrongdoers. We must be ready to forget and forgive (Rom 12:20). "Be ye kind one to another, tenderhearted, forgiving each other, even as God also in Christ forgave you" (Eph 4:32).
The theological virtues or Christian graces-faith, hope, charity. Some have been content to see in these three graces the summary of Christian excellence. They are fundamental in Christ's teaching and the apostolic combination of them may have had its basis in some lost word of the Master (Harnack). These graces cannot be separated. They are all of a piece. He who has faith has also love, and he who has faith and love cannot be devoid of hope. Love is the first and last word of apostolic Christianity. No term is more expressive of the spirit of Christ. Love was practically unknown in the ancient world. Pre-Christian philosophy exalted the intellect but left the heart cold. Love in the highest sense is the discovery and creation of the gospel, and it was reserved for the followers of Jesus to teach men the meaning of charity and to find in it the law of freedom. It is indispensable to true Christian character. Without it no profession of faith or practice of good deeds has any value (1 Cor 13). It is the fruitful source of all else that is beautiful in conduct. Faith itself works through love and finds in its activity its outlet and exercise. If character is formed by faith it lives in love. And the same may be said of hope. It is a particular form of faith which looks forward to a life that is to be perfectly developed and completed in the future. Hope is faith turned to the future--a vision inspired and sustained by love.
Of the duties of the Christian life it is enough to say that they find their activity in the threefold relationship of the Christian to self, to his fellow-men and to God. This distinction is not of course quite logical. The one involves the other. Self-love implies love of others, and all duty may be regarded as duty to God. The individual and society are so inextricably bound together in the kingdom of love that neither can reach its goal without the other.
Duties toward self are, however, plainly recognized in the New Testament. our Lord's commandment, "Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself," makes a rightly conceived self-love the measure of love to one's neighbor. But the duties of self-regard are only lightly touched upon, and while the truth that the soul has an inalienable worth is insisted upon, to be constantly occupied with the thought of oneself is a symptom of morbid egoism and not a sign of healthy personality. But the chief reason why the New Testament does not enlarge upon the duty of self-culture is that according to the spirit of the gospel the true realization of self is identical with self-sacrifice. Only as a man loses his life does he find it. Not by anxiously standing guard over one's soul but by dedicating it freely to the good of others does one realize one's true self.
At the same time several self-respecting duties are recognized, of which mention may be made: (i) stability of purpose or singleness of aim; (ii) independence of other's opinion; (iii) supremacy of conscience and a proper self-estimate. In this connection may be noticed also the Christian's proper regard for the body which, as the temple of God, is not to be despised but presented as a living sacrifice; his attitude to worldly goods; his obligation to work; his right to recreation; and his contentment with his station--all of which duties are to be interpreted by the apostolic principle, "Use the world as not abusing it." The Christian ideal is not asceticism or denial for its own sake. Each must make the best of himself and the most of life's trust. All the faculties, possessions, pursuits and joys of life are to be used as vehicles of spiritual service, instruments which make a man a fit subject of the kingdom of God to which he belongs.
(b) Duties in Relation to Others:
Duties in relation to others, or brotherly love, are defined as to their extent and limit by the Christian's relation to Christ. Their chief manifestations are: (i) justice, involving respect for others, negatively refraining from injury and positively yielding deference and honor, truthfulness, in word and deed, "speaking the truth in love," just judgment, avoiding censoriousness and intolerance; (ii) kindness or goodness, embracing sympathy, service and practical beneficence which provides for physical need, administers comfort and gives, by example and direct instruction, edification; (iii) patience, comprising forbearance, peaceableness.
(c) Duties in Relation to God:
Here morality runs up into religion and duty passes into love. Love rests on knowledge of God as revealed in Christ, and expresses itself in devotion. Love to God is expressed generally in (i) thankfulness, (ii) humility, (iii) trustfulness; and particularly in worship (sacraments and prayers), and in witness-bearing--adorning the doctrine by beauty of life.
(3) Spheres and Relationships.
Of the various spheres and relationships in which the Christian finds opportunity for the exercise and cultivation of his spiritual life we can only name, without enlarging upon them, the family, the state and the church. Each of these spheres demands its own special duties and involves its own peculiar discipline. While parents owe to their children care and godly nurture, children owe their parents obedience. The attitude of the individual to the state and of the state to the individual are inferences which may be legitimately drawn from New Testament teaching. It is the function of the state not merely to administer iustice but to create and foster those agencies and institutions which work for the amelioration of the lot and the development of the weal of its citizens, securing for each full liberty to make the best of his life. On the other hand it is the duty of the individual to realize his civic obligations as a member of the social organism. The state makes its will dominant through the voice of the people, and as the individuals are so the commonwealth will be.
Absoluteness, Inwardness and Universality.
In closing we may say that the three dominant notes of Christian ethics are, its absoluteness, its inwardness and its universality. The gospel claims to be supreme in life and morals. For the Christian no incident of experience is secular and no duty insignificant, because all things belong to God and all life is dominated by the Spirit of Christ. The uniqueness and originality of the ethics of Christianity are to be sought, however, not so much in the range of its practical application as in the unfolding of an ideal which is at once the power and pattern of the new life. That ideal is Christ in whom the perfect life is disclosed and through whom the power for its realization is communicated. Life is a force, and character is a growth which takes its rise in and expands from a hidden seed. Hence, in Christian ethics all apathy, passivity and inaction, which occupy an important place in the moral systems of Buddhism, Stoicism, and even medieval Catholicism, play no part. On the contrary all is life, energy and unceasing endeavor.
There are many details of modern social life with which the New Testament does not deal: problems of presentday ethics and economics which cannot be decided by a direct reference to chapter and verse, either of the Gospels or Epistles. But Paul's great principles of human solidarity; of equality in Christ; of freedom of service and love; his teachings concerning the church and the kingdom of God, the family and the state; his precepts with regard to personal purity, the use of wealth and the duty of work, contained the germs of the subsequent renewal of Europe and still contain the potency of social and political transformation.
LITERATURE.
General Works on Ethics:
Lotze, Paulsen, Wundt, Green, Sidgwick, Stephen, Dewey and Tufts, Palmer, Bowne, Mezer; Harris, Moral Evolution; Dubois; Randall, Theory of Good and Evil; Calderwood, Handbook of Moral Philosophy; Muirhead, Elementary Ethics; Sutherland, Origin and Growth of Moral Instinct; Simmel, Einleitung in die Moralwissenschaft; Givycky, Moralphilosophic; Guyot, La morale; Janet, Theory Morals (translation); Mackenzie, Manual of Ethics; Eucken, works generally; Hensel, Hauptproblem der Ethik; Lipps, Die ethischen Grundfragen; Natorp, Socialpadagogik; Schuppe, Grundzuge der Ethik u. Rechtsphilosophie; Schwarz, Das sittliche Leben; Wentscher, Ethik.
General History:
See Histories of Philosophy; Zeller, Erdmann, Windelband, Maurice, Turner, Weber, Rogers, Alexander; Jodl, Geschichte der Ethik in der neueren Philosophic.
Works on Theological or Christian Ethics
Old Testament: Dillmann, Baudissin, Bertmann, Geschichte der christlichen Sitte; Konig, Hauptprobleme der Altes Testament Religions-Geschichte; Delitzsch, Riehm, Kuenen; Mozley, Ruling Ideas in Early Ages; Hessey, Moral Difficulties in the Bible; Moore, in Lux mundi; Ladd, Doctrine of Sacred Scripture; Robertson, Early Religion of Israel; Caillard, Progressive Revelation; Schultz, Old Testament Theology (English translation); Bruce, Ethics of the Old Testament; N. Smyth, Christian Ethics; Startton; Strong.
New Testament and Christianity:
Martinsen, Wuttke, Schletermacher, Rothe, Dorner, H. Weiss, Harlen, Hofmann, Frank, Luthardt, Beck, Kiibel, Kahler, Pfieiderer, Schultz, Kostlin; Herrmann, Faith and Morals; Communion of the Christian with God; Thomas, Jacoby, Lemme, Strong, Knight, N. Smyth; Ottley in Lux mundi and Christian Ideas and Ideals; W. L. Davidson, Christian Ethics, Guild Series; W. T. Davidson, Christian Interpretation of Life and Christian Conscience; Mackintosh; Murray, Handbook of Christian Ethics; Maurice, Social Morality; Nash, Ethics and Revelation; Dobschiitz, Christian Life in the Primitive Church; Clark, Christian Method of Ethics; Mathews, The Church and the Changing Order; Freemantle, The World as the Subject of Redemption; The Gospel in Secular Life; Sladden, Applied Christianity; Leckie, Life and Religion; Rauschenbusch, Christianity and the Social Order; Peile, The Reproach of the Gospel; Coe, Education in Religion and Morals; Haering, The Ethics of the Christian Life (English translation); Tymms, Ancient Faith in Modern Light; Harris, God, the Creator; Bovon, Morale chretienne; Wace, Christianity and Morality; Kidd, Morality and Religion; Drummond, Via, Veritas, Vita; Hatch, Greek Ideas and the Christian Church; Matheson, Landmarks of New Testament Morality.
Works on New Testament Theology:
Also contain section on Ethics; Weiss, Holtzmann, Beyschlag; Harnack, Das Wesen, or What Is Christianity?; Stevens; Wernle, The Beginnings of Christianity; Adeney, Gould, Gardner, Bosworth, Briggs; Caird, Evolution of Religion.
Works on the Teaching of Jesus:
Especially Wendt, Bruce, Stevens, Horton, Jackson, Swete, Latham, Pastor Pastorum; Tolstoy; Julicher. See next article for the works on the Ethics of Jesus.
Special Works on Apostolic Ethics:
Ernesti, Ethik des Apostels Paulus; A. Alexander, The Ethics of Paul; Weinel, Paul; Baur, Paulinismus; Joh. Weiss, Paul and Jesus.
History of Christian Ethics:
Wuttke, Sidgwick, Ziegler, Luthardt, Thomas; Martineau, Types of Ethical Theory; Gass; Scharling, Christliche Sittenlehre; Lecky, History of European Morals; Pfleiderer.
Arch. B. D. Alexander
e-thi-o'-pi-a (kush; Aithiopia):
1. Location, Extent and Population:
Critically speaking Ethiopia may refer only to the Nile valley above the First Cataract, but in ancient as in modern times the term was often used not only to include what is now known as Nubia and the Sudan (Soudan), but all the unknown country farther West and South, and also at times Northern, if not Southern, Abyssinia. While Ethiopia was so indefinitely large, yet the narrow river valley, which from the First to the Fifth Cataract represented the main agricultural resources of the country, was actually a territory smaller than Egypt and, excluding deserts, smaller than Belgium (W. Max Muller). The settled population was also small, since in ancient as in modern times Egypt naturally drew away most of the able-bodied and energetic youth as servants, police and soldiers. The prehistoric population of Northern Nubia was probably Egyptian but this was displaced in early historic time by a black race, and the thick lips and woolly hair of the typical African are as well marked in the oldest Egyptian paintings as in the latest. But by the side of these natives of K'sh, the artist also represents various reddish-brown varieties; for from the beginning of historic time the pure Negro stock has been mixed with the fellaheen of Egypt and with the Sere population of the Arabian coast. The rulers of Ethiopia were generally of foreign blood. The Negroes, though brave and frugal, were slow in thought, and although controlled for centuries by cultivated neighbors, under whom they attained at times high official prominence, yet the body of the people remained uninfluenced by this civilization. The country which we now know as Abyssinia was largely controlled, from the earliest known date, by a Caucasian people who had crossed the Red Sea from Arabia. The true Abyssinians, as Professor Littmann shows, contain no Negro blood and no Negro qualities. In general they are "well formed and handsome, with straight and regular features, lively eyes, hair long and straight or somewhat curled and in color dark olive approaching brown." Modern discoveries prove their close racial and linguistic connection with Southern Arabia and particularly with the kingdom of Sheba (the Sabeans), that most powerful people whose extensive architectural and literary remains have recently come to light. The Sabean inscriptions found in Abyssinia go back some 2,600 years and give a new value to the Bible references as well as to the constant claim of Josephus that the queen of Sheba was a "queen of Ethiopia." The Falashas are a Jewish community living near Lake Tsana, of the same physical type and probably of the same race as other Abyssinians. Their religion is a "pure Mosaism" based upon the Ethiopic version of the Pentateuch, but modified by the fact that they are ignorant of the Hebrew language (Jewish Encyclopedia). It is uncertain when they became Jews. The older scholars thought of them as dating back to the Solomonic era, or at least to the Babylonian captivity. Since the researches of Joseph Halevy (1868), some date within the Christian era has seemed preferable, notwithstanding their ignorance of Talmudic rules. However, the newly discovered fact that a strong Jewish community was flourishing at Syene in the 6th century BC makes it clear that Jewish influence may have been felt in Ethiopia at least that early. Although Abyssinians are noted for their strict adherence to ancient custom, Jewish characteristics are prominent all over the entire country. The opening formula of the king in every official letter--"The Lion of the Tribe of Judah has Conquered!"--is no more Jewish than scores of ordinary phrases and customs. Although it is barely possible that some rites, like circumcision and observance of the Sabbath, may have been received from the ancient Egyptians or Christian Coptics (The New Schaff-Herzog Encyclopedia of Religious Knowledge Encyclopedia) yet a strong Hebrew influence cannot be denied. All travelers speak of the "industry" of the Falashas and of the "kindliness and grave courtesy" of the Abyssinians. Besides those named above there are many communities of mixed races in Ethiopia, but the ancient basis is invariably Negro, Semitic or Egyptian
The ancient Greek writers are full of fantastic and fabulous stories about Ethiopia. Sometimes they become so puzzled in their geography as to speak of Ethiopia as extending as far as India; their notes concerning the miraculous fauna and flora are equally Munchausian. Homer praises the Ethiopians as the "blameless race," and other writers rank them first among all men for their religious knowledge. This latter notion may have had its origin from a priestly desire to consider the Ethiopian reverence for the priesthood--which had the power of life and death over the kings--as the Divinely ordained primitive custom, or it may have sprung from the fact that the Egyptian "Land of the Gods" was partly situated in Southern Abyssinia. It is suggestive that the Hebrew prophets never fell into these common errors but invariably "gave a very good idea of geographical and political conditions" (W. Max Muller). The oldest important historic document referring to Ethiopia is from the IVth Dynasty of Egypt. when Sneferu laid waste the land, capturing 7,000 slaves and 100,000 cattle.
In the VIth Dynasty the Egyptians reached as far South as the Second Cataract and brought back some dwarfs, but did not establish any permanent control. In the XIIth Dynasty Egypt's real occupation of Ethiopia began. Usertesen III records his contempt by saying: "The Negro obeys as soon as the lips are opened. They are not valiant, they are miserable, both tails and bodies!" Notwithstanding this satiric reference, these naked Ethiopians clad in skins and tails of wild animals, compelled the Pharaoh to make several campaigns before he could establish a frontier at the Second Cataract beyond which no Negro could come without a permit. That the natives were not cowardly may be seen from the songs of triumph over their subjection and from the fact that every later Pharaoh encouraged them to enlist in his army, until finally the very hieroglyphic for archer became a Nubian. The XVIIIth Dynasty pushed the frontier beyond the Third Cataract into the splendid Dongola district and often boasts of the rich tribute from Ethiopia., in one case 2,667 "manloads" of ivory, ebony, perfumes, gold and ostrich feathers besides cattle, wild beasts and slaves. The chairs of ivory and the jewelry sometimes shown seem barbaric in style but excellent in workmanship. Copper and bronze factories and great iron foundries date also to a very early time in Ethiopia (PSBA, XXXIII, 96). The Ethiopian gold mines where hundreds of criminals toiled, with ears and noses mutilated, made gold in Egypt in the 15th century BC as "common as dust." The choicest son of the Pharaoh, next to him in power, was proud to be called "Prince of Kush." Amenhotep IV (1370 BC), the religious reformer, built his second greatest temple (the only one of his works now existent) in Nubia. The XIXth Dynasty sought to colonize Ethiopia., and some of the most magnificent temples ever built by man can be seen as far South as the Fourth Cataract. For over five centuries Egyptian rule was maintained, until about 1000 BC a war for independence began which was so successful that the victorious Ethiopian kings finally carried their armies against Thebes and Memphis and for a century (763-663) ruled all Egypt from Napata--which in religious architecture became the Southern Thebes--and for another century (and even at times during the Ptolemaic era) controlled upper Egypt. While the leaders of this revolution were doubtless descendants of exiled priests from Thebes, yet the mixture of Ethiopian blood is plainly discernible and is perhaps also shown in their "Puritan morals" (Petrie, III, 276) and spirit of clemency, so different from the legitimate Pharaohs. Shabaka = So (715-707) and Taharka = Tirhaqah (693-667), both mentioned in the Bible, were the last great kings of Ethiopia. When Tanutamen, son of Shabaka and nephew of Taharka (667-664), was forced by Ashurbanipal to give up his claim to Egypt and retire to the South, the influence of Ethiopia ceased. Cambyses (525-521) made Ethiopia tributary clear to the Third Cataract (compare Ezek 30:4), while King Ergamenes, near the close of the 3rd century BC, broke forever the power of the Egyptian priesthood. Though the Romans held a nominal protectorate over Ethiopia, it was of so little importance as to be scarcely ever mentioned. After being expelled from Egypt the Ethiopians still continued to honor the gods of Thebes, but, as foreign influence ceased, the representations of this worship became more and more African and barbaric. Even after Christianity had triumphed everywhere else, the Nubians, as late as the 5th century AD, were still coming to Philae to give honor to the statue of Isis (Erman). In the 6th century AD a native king, Silko, established a Christian kingdom in the Northern Sudan with Dongola as its capital. This raised somewhat the culture of the land. In the next century the Arabs made Nubia tributary, though it took an immense army to do it. For six centuries thereafter Islam demanded a tribute of 360 slaves annually, and other treasure, though innumerable campaigns were necessary to collect it. The Nubian kings refused all overtures to become Moslems, and Christian churches multiplied along the banks of the Nile. In the 8th century Egypt was invaded by 100,000 Nubians to repay an insult given to the Coptic patriarch and to the sacred pictures in the Egyptian Christian churches. In the 13th century, David, king of Nubia, not only withheld tribute but invaded Egypt. He was terribly punished, however, by the Arabs, who sacked churches and tortured Christians clear to the Fourth Cataract. This was the beginning of the end. By the close of the 15th century almost every Christian altar was desolate and every church destroyed.
Winckler long ago proved that the Assyrians designated a district in Northern Arabia by the same name which they ordinarily applied to Ethiopia. Skinner (Genesis, 1910, 208) thinks the Hebrews also made this distinction and were therefore entirely right when they spoke of Nimrod as "son of Gush," since the earliest Babylonian dynasty had as a matter of fact a Semitic origin. There may be other references to an Arabian district, but undoubtedly the African Kush must be the one generally designated. This is referred to once in the New Testament and over 40 times in the Old Testament. Many secular monuments speak of the high honor paid to women in Ethiopia., and Candace (Acts 8:27) seems certainly to have been an official or dynastic name for a number of Ethiopian queens. One of the pyramids of Meroe was Candace's--her picture can still be seen at Kaga--and to her belonged the wonderful treasure of jewelry found in 1834 by Ferlini and now in the Berlin museum. Petronius (24 BC) raided Ethiopia for Rome and stormed the capital, but Candace sent ambassadors to Rome and obtained peace. The "eunuch" who may have been the treasurer of this very queen was probably "no black proselyte but a Jew who had placed the business ability of his race at the service of the Nubian woman" (W. Max Muller). In the Old Testament Ethiopia is spoken of with great respect, and several Bible characters are named Cushi (2 Sam 18:21 the King James Version; Jer 36:14; Zeph 1:1); even Moses married an Ethiopian wife (Nu 12:1), and Ebed-melek the Ethiopian is helper to Jeremiah (Jer 38:7). It is a great land situated beyond the frontiers of the civilized world (Ezek 29:10), yet with Jews in its farthest district (Zeph 3:10). It is very rich (Job 28:19; Isa 43:3); is engaged in trade with Arabia (45:14), and its citizens are proud of their nationality (Ps 87:4). Again and again the relation of Cush with Sheba is mentioned (Gen 10:7,28; Isa 43:3, etc.), which latter statement is strangely corroborated by the recently discovered Sabean inscriptions throughout Abyssinia. Its typical inhabitants have a color as unchangeable as the leopard's spots (Jer 13:23), are careless (Ezek 30:9), but very warlike (Ezek 38:5; Jer 46:9), giving "infinite" strength to Nineveh (Nah 3:9), but who can be resisted by Israel because of Yahweh's favor (2 Ch 16:8; Isa 20:5; 36:6). Yahweh is interested in the history of Ethiopia as well as Egypt (Isa 20:3), loves the children of Ethiopia as the children of Israel (Am 9:7), and the time is coming when Ethiopia shall yet stretch out her hands to Yahweh (Ps 68:31). Cush and Mizraim are correctly mentioned as political unit (Isa 20:4 f) , and several kings of Ethiopia are mentioned by name--Zerah (2 Ch 14:9), So (2 Ki 17:4) and Tirhaqah (2 Ki 19:9; Isa 37:9). The statements concerning these kings have been pronounced incorrect because it seemed that Zerah could not possibly be an equivalent for Usarkon or So for Shabaka--the known kings of Egypt at those periods--and also because the reigns of Shabaka and Tirhaqah did not begin until after the dates at which in the Hebrew records they were called "kings of Ethiopia."
Recent, information, however, makes it clear that both Shabaka and Tirhaqah exercised royal authority in the Delta before they were given it farther south, and that the Hebrew transcription of names was very easy and natural. (See W. M. Flinders Petrie, Hist of Egypt, III, 280-309; Egypt and Israel (1911), 76-78.)
Sem influence entered Abyssinia at least as early as the 7th or 8th century BC (see above), and the kings of Axum claimed descent from Menelek, Son of Solomon, but the first certain information concerning the kingdom of Axum comes from the middle of the 1st centuryAD , at which time Axum was a rich capital, and its ancient sacredness was so great that from that period clear down to the 19th century the kings of Abyssinia would travel there to be crowned. There is no reason to doubt that Frumentius (circa 330 AD) was the first to introduce Christianity. Merope of Tyre, according to the often-told story, when returning from India with his two nephews, was captured and killed off the Ethiopian coast, but the two boys were carried to the Abyssinian king; and although one perished the other, Frumentius, succeeded in converting the king and his people to Christianity, and later was himself consecrated by Athanasius of Alexandria as the first Metropolitan of Ethiopia, taking as his title Abu Salama ("Father of Peace"). From that time until now, with but one single interruption, the Abuna ("Father") has always been appointed by the Patriarch of Alexandria and, since the 13th century, has been by legal necessity not a native Abyssinian, but a Copt.
After the Council of Chalcedon (450 AD) condemned all as heretics who did not accept the "double nature" of Christ, both the Egyptian and Abyssinian churches separated themselves from Rome, believing so thoroughly in the Deity of Christ as to refuse to accept His humanity as essential "nature." In the 5th century a great company of monks entered Abyssinia, since which time the monastic tendency has been strongly marked. About 525, Caleb, king of Axum, attacked the Homeritae across the Red Sea--either for their persecution of Christians or their interference with his trade--and for some half a century controlled a large district of Arabia. At this time Abyssinian trade was extensive. Greek influence was also felt, and the Christian cathedral at Axum was a magnificent work of architectural article The early churches were protected by heavy surrounding walls and strong towers. The invasion of Africa by Islam in the 7th century required 300 years of battle for the preservation of Abyssinian liberty and Christian faith. It alone of all the African states succeeded in preserving both--but its civilization was destroyed, and for 1,000 years it was completely hidden from the eyes of its fellow- Christians in Europe. Occasionally during those centuries a rumor would reach Europe of a "Prester John" somewhere in the Far East who was king of a Christian people, yet it was a thrilling surprise to Christendom when Pedro de Cavilham in the 15th century discovered this lost Christian kingdom of Abyssinia completely surrounded by infidel pagans and bigoted Mohammedans. When, early in the 16th century, the Negus of Abyssinia sent an envoy to the king of Portugal asking his help against the Moslems, the appeal was met with favor. In 1520 the Portuguese fleet arrived in the Red Sea and its chaplain, Father Francisco Alvarez, 20 years later stirred the Christian world by his curious narratives. Not long afterward, when the Arabs actually invaded the country, another Portuguese fleet was sent with a body of military, commanded by Christopher de Gama. These 450 musketeers and the six little pieces of artillery gave substantial aid to the endangered state. Father Lobe tells the story. The Abyssinian king must have been grateful for such help, yet presently the strenuous efforts of the Portuguese clergy to convert him and his people to the Roman Catholic faith became so offensive that Bermudez, the most zealous missionary, was compelled to leave the country and the Jesuits who remained were mistreated. Other efforts to win the Abyssinian Christians to renounce the Monophysitic heresy and accept the doctrine and control of Rome were somewhat more successful. Early in the 17th century Father Pedro Paez, an ecclesiastic of much tact, won the king fully to his faith, and under his direction many churches were erected and advantageous government works carried on. However, his successor Mendez lacked his conciliatory ability and, although a punishment of seven years' chastisement was proclaimed against recalcitrants, the opposition became so violent and universal that the Negus Sysenius finally abdicated in favor of his son Fasilidas, who in 1633 sent all Jesuits out of the country and resumed official relations with the Egyptian church. Since then, although many efforts have been made, no controlling influence has ever been obtained by Rome. Once more, for over a century, Abyssinia became completely hidden from the eyes of the outside world until James Bruce, the explorer, visited the country, 1770-72, and made such a report as to arouse again the interest of Christendom. The translation of the Bible, which was made by his Abyssinian guide, was adopted and published by the British and Foreign Bible Society, and in 1829 the Church Missionary Society sent out Gobat and Kugler as the first Protestant missionaries to Abyssinia, who were followed shortly after by some Roman Catholics. Owing chiefly to the opposition of native priests the Protestants were expelled in 1838 and the expulsion of the Roman missionaries followed in 1854. In 1858 a Copt who had been influenced as a youth by a Protestant school, became Abuna, and Protestant missionaries were again admitted, but succeeded in doing little permanent work owing to the political disturbances while King Kesa (Theodore)--the Napoleon of Africa--was attempting to consolidate native resources and build up an African empire. At this period the influence of Great Britain began to be felt in Abyssinia. After the suicide of Theodore (1868) and especially after Menelek II had succeeded in making himself emperor (1899), this influence became great. During the 20th century missionaries have been able to work in Abyssinia without much danger, but the Moslem influence is so preponderating that little has been attempted and little done. The religion of the Crescent seems now almost completely victorious over the strange land which for so many centuries, alone and unhelped, held aloft in Africa the religion of the Cross. (See especially The Mohammedan World of Today, by Zwemer, Wherry, and Barton, 1907; Missionary World, 1910-11.)
In creed, ritual, and practice, the Abyssinian church agrees generally with the Coptic. There are seven sacraments and prayers for the dead, high honor is paid to the Virgin Mary and to the saints; fasts and pilgrimages are in much favor; adults are baptized by immersion and infants by affusion. A blue cord is placed about the neck at baptism. An extract from one of the Gospels, a silver ring, an ear pick and a small cross, often very artistic, are also worn about the neck. No charms or beads or crucifixes ("graven images") are worn. The Jewish as well as the Christian Sabbath is kept sacred, and on an average every other day during the year is a religious holiday. The people are ignorant and superstitious, yet impress observers with their grave kindliness and seem at times eager to learn. The clergy can marry before but not after ordination. Priests must be able to read and recite the Nicene Creed (the "Apostles' Creed" is not known), but do not understand the Ge`ez language in which the liturgies are written. They conduct many and long services and attend to the ceremonial purifications. Deacons must also be able to read; they prepare the bread for the Holy Sacrament and in general help the priests. The monastic clergy have chief care of the education of the young--though this consists mainly in Scripture reading--and their head, the Etshege, ranks next to the Abuna.
The ancient churches were often basilican, but modern native churches are quadrangular or circular. The Holy of Holies always stands in the center, and is supposed to contain an ark. Tradition declares that the ark in the cathedral at Axum is the original ark from Solomon's temple. An outer court surrounds the body of the church, which is freely used by laymen and as a place of entertainment for travelers. Very crude pictures are common. These show both Egyptian and European influence, and are probably not merely decorations but have a relation, as in Egyptian thought, to spiritual advancement in this life or the next (compare Budge, Introduction to the Lives of Maba' Segon and Gabra Krestos, 1898). The services consist of chanting psalms, reading Scriptures and reciting liturgies.
The Abyssinian canon (Semanya Ahadu) consists of 46 Old Testament and 35 New Testament books. Besides the usually accepted books, they count Shepherd of Hermas, Synodos (Canons), Epistles of Clement, Maccabees, Tobit, Judith, Wisdom, Ecclesiasticus, Baruch, 4 Ezra, Ascension of Isaiah, Book of Adam, Joseph ben Gorion, Enoch and Jubilees. The Ethiopic texts of the two latter give these books in the most ancient form, and their discovery has led to much valuable discussion. The use of the Ge`ez language in which these are written dates back to a time shortly before the introduction of Christianity. From the 5th to 7th centuries AD, the literature is almost exclusively translated from Greek writers or adaptations of such writings. Quotations abound from Basil, Gregory, Ignatius, Athanasius, Epiphanus, Cyril, Dioscurus, etc. The second literary period begins 1268, when the old "Solomonic" Dynasty regained its place and continues to the present; it consists mainly of translations from the Arabic. In both periods the topics are few: liturgies, hymns, sermons, the heroic deeds of the saints and their orthodoxy. Each saint uses the four Holy Gospels, as David his four stones, to kill every heretical Goliath (compare Goodspeed and Crum, Patrologia Orientalis,IV , 1908). A large place is given to miracles and magic prayers and secret names (compare Budge, Miracles of the Virgin Mary, 1900, and "Magic Book of Disciples,"JAOS , 1904). The legends or histories are occasionally well written, as the famous "Magda Queen of Sheba" (English Translation by Mrs. J. Van Vorst, 1907), but usually are as inferior in style as in thought (compare Littmann, Bibliotheca-Abessinica, 1904). A few specimens of "popular literature" and many Abyssinian "proverbs" are extant (JAOS, XXIII, 51-53; XXV, 1-48; Jour. asiatique, IV, 487-95).
The modern Nubian does not write, and his ancient predecessors wrote but little. Even in the days of the Pharaohs the hieroglyphics in most Nubian temples were written so poorly as to be almost unintelligible, and in later pre-Christian monuments put up by native rulers the usual tablets accompanying the Divine tableaux are often left blank. Some centuries before our era the necessary monumental inscriptions began to be composed in the Nubian language, though still written in hieroglyphics. Shortly after the beginning of the Christian era a native cursive writing begins to be used on the monuments, closely resembling the Egyptian demotic, from which undoubtedly its alphabet was derived (F. L. Griffith in Areika). Finally, after Nubia became Christian (6th century), another native system appears written in Greek and Coptic letters. Lepsius found two such inscriptions on the Blue Nile and numbers have since been discovered, but until 1906 these were as unreadable as the other two forms of Nubian writing. In that year Dr. Karl Schmidt found in Cairo two precious fragments of parchment which had been owned by some Nubian Christians of probably the 8th or 9th century. One of these contained a selection of passages from the New Testament--as was ascertained by comparing it with the Greek and Coptic Scriptures. By the aid of bilingual cartouches several proper names were soon deciphered. New inscriptions are now being brought to light every few months, and undoubtedly the translation of this important tongue, which contains the "history of an African Negro dialect for some 2,000 years" and also the religious history of the long-lost Christian church of the Sudan, will soon be accomplished. The other fragment found by Schmidt was a curious Hymn of the Cross, well representing the ancient Ethiopian hymnology:
"The cross is the hope of Christians;
The cross is the resurrection of the dead;
The cross is the physician of the sick;
The cross is the liberator of the slave," etc..
--James H. Breasted in Biblical World, December, 1908; Nation, June 2, 1910.
Scientific observation of Nubia began with Burckhardt (1813), Cailliaud, and Waddington (1821), and especially with Lepsius (1844), but excavation in the proper sense was begun by the University of Chicago (1905-7), followed (1907-10) by expeditions sent out by the Royal Academy of Berlin, University of Pennsylvania, University of Liverpool, and Oxford University.
LITERATURE.
Besides the works quoted above, among recent Encyclopedias, see especially Encyclopedia Britannica (11th edition) (11th edition) and New Sck-Herz; and among the more recent books: James T. Bent, The Sacred City of the Ethiopians (1893); Glaser, Die Abessinier in Arabien und Afrika (1895); A. B. Wylde, Modern Abyssinia (1901); R. P. Skinner, Abyssinia of Today (1906); Th. Noeldeke, Die athiopische Litteratur (1906); Louis J. Morie, Les civilisations africaines (1904); Littmann, Geschichte der athiopischen Litteratur (1907); W. Max Muller, Aethiopien (1904); Petrie, Hist of Egypt (1895-1901); J. H. Breasted, Temples of Lower Nubia (1906); Monuments of Sudanese Nubia (1908); A. E. Weigall, Report of Antiquities of Lower Nubia (1906); E. A. W. Budge, The Egyptian Sudan (1907); Kromrei, Glaubenslehre und Gebrauche der alteren abessinischen Kirche (1895); M. Fowler, Christian Egypt (1901); Dowling, Abyssinian Church (1909); "Meroe," the City of the Ethiopians, by Liverpool University Expedition (1909-10); University of Pennsylvania Publications, Egyptian Dept., Eckley B. Coxe, Jr., Expedition to Nubia, I-IV (1909-11); Archeological Survey of Nubia; and Egyptian government reports.
Camden M. Cobern
e-thi-o'-pi-an u'-nuk eunouchos): A man who occupied a leading position as treasurer at the court of Candace, queen of the Ethiopians, and who was converted and baptized by Philip the deacon (Acts 8:27-39). Being a eunuch, he was not in the full Jewish communion (compare Dt 23:1), but had gone up to Jerusalem to worship, probably as a proselyte at the gate. During his return journey he spent the time in studying Isaiah, the text which he used being that of the Septuagint (compare Professor Margoliouth, article "Ethiopian Eunuch" inHDB ). On meeting with Philip the deacon, who was on his way to Gaza, he besought of him to shed light upon the difficulties of the Scripture he was reading, and through this was converted. The place of his baptism, according to Jerome and Eusebius, was Bethsura: by some modern authorities, e.g. G. A. Smith, it has been located at or near Gaza. The verse containing the confession of the eunuch, "I believe that Jesus Christ is the Son of God," is omitted either in whole or in part by some texts, but Hilgenfeld, Knowling, etc., regard it as quite in keeping with the context. Tischendorf, Westcott and Hort, Revised Version (British and American) text, etc., uphold the omission. The verse occurs in the body of the King James Version, but is given only as a footnote in the Revised Version (British and American) and the American Standard Revised Version. The diligence with which the eunuch pursued his reading, the earnestness with which he inquired of Philip, and the promptness with which he asked for baptism--all testify to the lofty nature of his character.
C. M. Kerr
See CUSHITE WOMAN .
e-thi-op'-ik lan'-gwaj: The language commonly called Ethiopic is the language in which the inscriptions of the kings of the ancient Aksumitic (Axumite) empire and most of the literature of Christian Abyssinia are written. It is called lesana Ge`ez, "the tongue of Ge`ez," by the Abyssinians themselves, most probably because it was originally the dialect of the Ge`ez tribe, who in antiquity must have dwelt in or near Aksum (Axum).
The names Ethiopia and Ethiopians have been used in many different meanings by various peoples. To the Greeks, Ethiopia was a country South of Egypt, and in this sense the word is generally used in the histories of Egypt. The Ethiopian kings came from that country which is now called Nubia in the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan. In Hellenistic times the term received a wider meaning, and Ethiopia was the name of all the land between the Red Sea and the Nile, south of Egypt proper. Sometimes "Indian" and "Ethiopian" were synonymous, or Ethiopia was even considered to stretch as far as to the Atlantic Ocean in the West. But of these countries the Greeks and Romans had very little exact geographical knowledge.
See ETHIOPIA .
The fact that Ethiopia at some time meant the country between the Red Sea and the Nile prompted the pagan kings of Aksum in northern Abyssinia to adopt this name for their own country and to give it a narrower sense than the one which it had at that time. Therefore in the bilingual inscription of King Aeizanas (`Ezana), the word Aithiopia, is a rendering of the Semitic Chabashat ("Abyssinia," but here more specially referring to Northern Abyssinia). Under this same king, about 350 AD, Abyssinia became Christian; and after the Bible had been translated into the Ge`ez language, the Abyssinians found that Ethiopia was mentioned there several times. Their national pride was flattered by the thought that their country should be referred to in the Holy Scriptures, and for this reason they were all the more ready to apply the name in question to their own country. Up to the present day they call it Ethiopia ('Itiopiya), and themselves Ethiopians; their legends speak even of an ancestor Itiopis.
We may then, if we choose to do so, speak of a Nubian and an Abyssinian Ethiopia, but the term "Ethiopic language" has come into general usage as an equivalent of lesana Ge`ez, and should therefore be applied only to the ancient literary language of Abyssinia.
This language is closely allied to the languages of Southern Arabia: it represents the southwestern branch of the southern division of the Semitic languages. The most important branch of this division is, of course, the Arabic language, and with this Ethiopic has a great deal in common. On the other hand there are many words and forms in Ethiopic which are not found in Arabic, but in Hebrew or even in Babylonian and Assyrian. It has been held that the home of the Semites was in Africa; and if that were the case, the people who spoke the Ethiopic language may never have migrated very much. But the majority of scholars who have expressed their opinion upon the subject believe that Asia was the home of the Semites; this is the opinion of the writer of this article also. Then the Semitic inhabitants of Abyssinia must have come from across the Red Sea. Their migration must have begun many centuries BC. It has hardly ever stopped, since Arabs in smaller, and sometimes in larger, numbers have been drifting into Abyssinia at all periods.
The Semitic conquerors of Abyssinia found peoples of two different races in the country where they settled: (1) African aborigines and (2) Kushites, a branch of the Hamitic family. Their languages were different from each other and, of course, different from that of the Semites also; some of them are spoken up to the present day. When the Semites first came and formed their literary language, they did not allow the languages of the country to influence their own speech very much; but gradually this influence grew stronger and stronger, and it is very evident in the modern Semitic languages of Abyssinia. An outline of the history of the Ethiopic language is as follows: Its oldest monument known so far is the Semitic part of the bilingual inscription of King `Ezana, which dates from the first half of the 4th century AD. Before that time Ethiopic must have been spoken, without doubt, but it was not written: Greek and Sabean were written instead. At the time of King `Ezana the knowledge of the Sabean language seems to have been very little; but Sabean script was still used. The Semitic part of the inscription just mentioned is in the Ethiopic language, but carved once in Sabean script and a second time in the native Ethiopic script which had been derived from the Sabean. In the first of these two "editions" two or three Sabean words are used instead of their Ethiopic equivalents. A few other ancient inscriptions found in the Aksumitic empire may also be dated from the same period.
Possibly in the same 4th century the translation of the Bible into Ethiopic was begun; and this fact marks the beginning of a real Ethiopic literature. Perhaps the Psalms and the Gospels were translated first, being most needed in the service of the Christian church. The different books of the Scriptures were translated by different men, some of whom rendered literally, some more according to the sense, some having a good, some only a poor, knowledge of the language from which, and the language into which, they translated. Both Testaments were translated from the Greek by men whose mother-tongue was probably Aramaic. This is proved by the presence of Greek and Aramaic words and by the forms in which the Hebrew names appear in Ethiopic transliteration. The oldest influences which the Ethiopic language experienced were therefore: (1) Sabean; a number of technical terms may have been adopted by the ancient Aksumites from the Sabean at the time when this was their literary language; (2) African, i.e. Kushite and native African; the Semitic conquerors found a great many new animals and trees or plants, which they did not know, in their new country, and in many cases they adopted their African names; (3) Aramaic, i.e. Jewish and Christian; these are mostly words referring to religious or theological matters; (4) Greek; some of the Greek words found in Ethiopic refer to religious matters in the same way as the Aramaic, others denote objects or ideas which the ancient Abyssinians received from the civilized world, others again are mere transliterations of Greek words in the Bible and other religious books, which the translators did not understand.
The time of the Aksumitic empire was the time when the Ethiopic language flourished. This empire was overthrown probably in the 7th or 8th century AD; and we know very little indeed of the history of Abyssinia from about 700 until about 1300 AD. In 1270 the so-called Solomonic Dynasty came to the throne again; the seat of the empire, however, was no longer Aksum but Gondar, North of Lake Tsana. Meanwhile the literary language had become a dead language; new dialects had sprung up and taken its place in everyday conversation. But Ge`ez continued to be the sacred language; it was the language of the Bible and of the church, and when in the 14th and 15th centuries a revival of Abyssinian literature came about, the literary language was Ge`ez. But it was influenced by the new dialects, especially by the Amharic, the language of Amhara, where Gondar was situated and where most of the books were written or translated. This influence affected in particular the spelling of Ge`ez in those books which dealt with religious matters and which therefore had to be written in pure Ge`ez. In historical books a great many words were taken from the Amharic; and this language, called lesana tarik, "the tongue of the chronicles," has often the appearance of mixed language.
In the 16th and 17th centuries European missionaries came to Abyssinia and tried to convert the monophysite Abyssinian Christians to Romanism. In order to come into close contact with the common people they used Amharic as a literary language, so that everybody, not only the learned, might understand their books. Their example was followed by the defenders of the native church; and since that time Amharic has become a recognized literary language in Abyssinia, although Ge`ez is still considered the real language of the church.
Amharic was derived from a sister language of the Ethiopic; the direct descendant of the Ethiopic language is modern Tigrina; a language derived from a dialect very closely related to Ge`ez is modern Tigre.
LITERATURE.
Ludolf, Historia Aethiopica, 1681; id, Commentarius ad suam historiam Aethiopicam, 1691; Dillmann, Grammatik der athiopischen Sprache (translated into English by Crichton) 1907, Intro; Littmann, Geschichte der athiopischen Litteratur, 1907.
Enno Littmann
e-thi-op'-ik vur'-shuns: Christianity was introduced into Abyssinia by Tyrian missionaries, who probably spoke Greek, about the time of Constantine the Great. The Bible was translated into Ethiopic, or, to use the native name, Ge`ez, the Old Testament being from the Septuagint, between the 4th and 5th centuries, by various hands, though the work was popularly ascribed to Frumentius, the first bishop. The fact of the Scriptures having been translated into Ethiopic was known to Chrysostom (Hom. II, in Joannem). The versions thus made were revised some time about the 14th century, and corrected by means of the Massoretic Text. The Ethiopic Scriptures contain the books found in the Alexandrine recension with the exception of the Books of Macc; but their importance lies in their pseudepigraphic writings, the Asc Isa, the Book of Enoch and the Book of Jubilees. The 1st edition of the New Testament appeared at Rome in 1545-49 (reprinted in Walton), but a critical edition has yet to be made; one issued by the British and Foreign Bible Society in 1830 contains many errors. The Old Testament canonical books and Apocrypha have been edited by Dillmann (the Octoteuch and 1-4 Kings and Apocrypha), Bachmann (died 1894) (Isa, Lam, Ob and Mal), and Ludolph (Pss). The Psalter has been often printed from 1513 on. The Book of Enoch was first translated by Richard Laurence and published at Oxford in 1821, but the standard editions are those of Dillmann (Leipzig, 1853) and R. H. Charles (Oxford, 1893). The importance of this work lies in the fact that "the influence of Enoch on the New Testament has been greater than that of all the other apocryphal and pseudepigraphal books taken together" (Charles, 41). Not only the phraseology and ideas, but the doctrines of the New Testament are greatly influenced by it. Of the canonical books and Apocrypha the manuscripts are too poor and too late to be of any value for the criticism of the Greek text.
Thomas Hunter Weir
eth'-ma (Ethma), the Revised Version (British and American) NOOMA (which see).
eth'-nan ('ethnan, "gift" or "hire"; Ethnadi): A Judahite (1 Ch 4:7).
eth'-nark (2 Cor 11:32 margin).
See GOVERNOR .
eth'-ni ('ethni, "gift"): An ancestor of Asaph, of the Gershom branch of the Levites (1 Ch 6:41).
eth-nog'-ra-fi, eth-nol'-o-ji.
See TABLE OF NATIONS .